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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the relationship between the state and economic change and
development in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It traces the development of
the Commonwealth's economy and of state intervention from colonial times,
through the transition to manufacturing industries, to the modern era of corporate
domination. Massachusetts was once at the forefront of economic development in
the United States and led the way in promoting industrialization. However, the
thesis shows that the economic base of the Commonwealth has now changed
dramatically: the importance of industry has declined and, although other non-
manufacturing activities have grown, the relative economic position of
Massachusetts has deteriorated. The thesis points out the severe consequences
these economic transformations have had for the people of the Commonwealth and
for their cities, towns and rural areas.
In analyzing the forces underlying these changes, the thesis finds that popular
presentations which suggest that the actions and attitudes of state government
bear a large responsibility for the Commonwealth's relative decline are quite
erroneous. Instead, it is demonstrated that the causes of the economic changes
experienced in Massachusetts lie basically in a broader process of uneven capitalist
economic development which operates at national and transnational levels.
Moreover, the thesis shows that rather than restricting business, the state has
played a fundamental role in facilitating capital accumulation.
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Based upon this analysis, the thesis explores the economic future for
Massachusetts. It argues that current state economic policies are unlikely to
discourage uneven economic development in the Commonwealth and concludes that
there is a vital need for a new, alternative approach at both the state and federal
levels. The thesis outlines some of the key elements of this alternative approach
and, in so doing, also identifies some of the problems which would be involved in
implementing it.
Thesis supervisor: Professor Bennett Harrison
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The contrast between developed and underdeveloped countries, between town and
country, between industries or different firms in the same industry, as well as
between different parts of the same country or the same city are all part of the
same process. Economists usually depict industrial development as a system in
which the play of market forces normally irons out all the differences and the
inqualities in the economic system: a self regulating system by which supply will
always tend to equalize demand, wages and prices will tend to equalize everywhere.
The reality is very different. Throughout its history capitalism has consistently
failed to develop evenly or harmoniously... its history is one of intermittent crisis
and depression during which significant inequalities between regions and areas grow
and persist.
National Community Development Project, The Costs of Industrial Decline
(London: C.D.P., 1977)
-7 -
39
Avow
THE "MILE OF MILLS" -LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, IN THE EARLY 1900's
-8-
I
-I
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two hundred years, the Massachusetts economy has undergone major
structural changes. From an eighteenth century agrarian and mercantile society,
Massachusetts developed into the first industrial state in the United States. By the
middle of the nineteenth century, the state was industrially pre-eminent and
technologically the most advanced and productive. Yet, in the twentieth century,
industrial manufacturing sharply declined while service and professional activities
steadily expanded. The pattern has been one of industrial growth and decline,
service development and unremitting economic change.
Of course, this pattern is not unique to Massachusetts: it can be seen in the older
industrial areas of Western Europe and throughout much of Northeastern USA. As
in these other areas, in Massachusetts, these economic changes have literally
transformed the lives of workers, their jobs and income levels, and the character of
cities and the countryside. For example, there have been significant shifts in the
locations of economic activities in the state. Industry has largely moved out of the
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cities to the suburbs and, to an extent, moved out of state; central city areas have
become the focus of corporate and financial activities; and rural areas have tended
to lose their traditional employment bases of agriculture, forestry and small-scale
manufacturing. In inner city neighborhoods, job loses have often far out-weighed
new jobs, and frequently those new jobs which have become available have been
either low-paying or of a type requiring skills which local workers do not possess.
As a consequence of these economic and locational changes, a very uneven
structure of employment has developed in the Commonwealth. In total, there are
not enough jobs for all those who want to work, there is an uneven geographic
distribution of existing jobs and job vacancies, and too many jobs pay low wages and
involve dull or dehumanizing work.(1)
What have been the changes in Massachusetts?
As recently as 1947, nearly 45 percent of the non-agricultural labor force worked in
manufacturing in Massachusetts.(2) The proportion now is just over one quarter. In
numbers of jobs, there were about 800,000 manufacturing manufacturing jobs in
1947, whereas in 1978 the average was 647,000. Over the same period, service-
sector non-manufacturing jobs nearly doubled, increasing from roughly 1,000,000 in
1947 to 1,850,000 in 1978.(3)
The most recent low point for the manufacturing sector in Massachusetts was the
recession trough of 1975, when employment plummeted, in June of that year, to
569,300. In that same month, non-manufacturing employment fell to 1,686,600, and
the official figures said 300,000 workers, or 12% of the labor force, were
unemployed.(4) With the national recovery in 1977 and 1978, employment in
Massachusetts has been regained in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing and
the Commonwealth ended 1978 with an official unemployment figure for the year
of "only" 6.1%. However, in 1979, employment growth rates in most of
Massachusetts' major industries have noticeably slowed(5) and the longer-term
outlook for manufacturing in the state is still, in the words of the Governor's
former economic advisor Richard Syron, "not so good." Syron points out that the
trends in manufacturing investment are still declining in Massachusetts.(6)
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CHANGING SECTORS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS ECONOMY
Employment (Thousands of Workers) Change
1951 (a) 1977(b) 1951 - 77
Manufacturing 746.9 41.0 618.3 26.4 -128.6 - 17.2
Construction 76.2 4.2 71.1 3.0 - 5.1 - 6.7
Transport, Utilities 120.5 6.6 109.5 4.7 - 11.0 - 9.1
Wholesale, Retail 362.9 19.9 532.6 22.8 +169.7 + 46.8
Finance, Ins., Real Est. 79.9 4.4 135.2 5.8 + 55.3 + 69.2
Services 222.7 12.2 484.3 20.7 +261.6 +117.5
Government 213.7 11.7 386.0 16.5 +172.3 + 80.6
Non-manufacturing 1,075.9 59.0 1,718.7 73.6 +642.8 + 59.7
TOTAL 1,822.8 100.0 2,337.0 100.0 +514.2 + 28.2
Sources: (a) Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939 - 75
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1977,
Bulletin 1370-12
(b) Employment and Wages in Establishments Subject To the
Massachusetts Employment Security Law (Boston, Mass:
Division of Employment Security, 1977).
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Within the overall decline in manufacturing over the last decades, there have been
even more dramatic shifts. In 1923, the two leading employers in Massachusetts
were the textile industry and boots, shoes and leather goods with 217,700 and
88,200 workers respectively.(7) By 1975, textiles employed just 25,600 workers,
while boot and shoemaking employment has dropped to 22,800. Thus, in little more
than 50 years, 257,500 jobs were lost in these two industries. In contrast, the
electronics and electrical machinery industry grew from 60,000 to 106,900 jobs
between 1947 and 1967. However, by 1972 it had contracted quite severely to
78,000, although by 1977, with 93,800 jobs, there had been some recovery.(8)
This pattern of growth in some industrial areas and sectors, and decline in many
others, is evident in much of the rest of the Commonwealth's manufacturing
structure over the years. But is is not true that growth in the high-technology
sectors in Massachusetts has balanced the decline of the old mill-based industries.
Between 1960 and 1975, traditional industries such as food processing, leather, and
textiles lost 61,000 jobs. Only 11,000 jobs were gained in the high-technology
industries of electrical machinery, transportation, and the like. However, service
jobs paying less than $5,800 a year increased by 60 percent, adding 170,000 jobs.(9)
In addition, many of the new jobs have been created in different locations from the
old ones. As plants in older areas have closed, severe dislocation has been caused
as workers have been forced to move to the suburbs for work or face unemployment
or underemployment if they remain. For those unable to move because of racial
barriers, poverty or lack of necessary qualifications, the problems have become
compounded. This shift in the location of jobs has been particularly rapid in the
post-war period. For example, in just the ten years between 1960 and 1970, the
City of Boston's share of the jobs in its metropolitan area decreased by nearly
seven percentage points, from 44.5 percent to 37.8 percent.(10)
This restructuring and relocation of key sectors of the Commonwealth's economy
has had important human consequences and has intensified social and racial
inequalities. Noticeable dichotomies have developed in the material quality
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of life between the newer suburbs and older cities. For example, per capita-
incomes were $5,390 in Boston's suburbs in 1974, but only $4,157 in the city. The
proportion of non-whites in those suburbs in 1970 was just 1.6% while it was 18.2%
in the city. Measured unemployment rates also differed - in the suburbs, the rate
was 7.3% in 1977, whereas in the city, it was 9.6%.(11) Moreover, although official
figures placed total unemployment in Massachusetts at 7.5% in 1978, youth
unemployment (16-19 years) was 19%, while the proportion of minority youth
without work was probably nearer 40%.(12)
Finally, in terms of personal income, it seems clear that Massachusetts has
declined in relation to the rest of the United States. In 1970, manufacturing wages
in the state were 96% of the national average; by February 1979, they had slipped
to 89.7%.(13) Going further back, and looking at income in all sectors of the
economy, per capital personal income in 1940 in Massachusetts was 131.8% of the
United States average; by 1977, it had fallen to 103.4% of the national figure. (14)
These figures do not take into account relative differences in the cost of living
between Massachusetts and elsewhere, nor do they say anything about the
distribution of income within the state - which has become more polarized since
World War II. Whereas in 1967, 60% of the Massachusetts workforce held jobs
paying above the Bureau of Labor Statistics lower living standard income level for
a family of four, by 1976 that figure had dropped to 48%. This drop reflects the
decline of high-paying primary jobs in the state and the growth of relatively low-
paid secondary employment and helps to explain why Massachusetts has such a
comparatively large proportion of its population in, or looking for, work. In order
to make ends meet, many families now need two wage earners rather than one.
Who is to blame?
In questioning why industry in Massachusetts has experienced long-term decline,
why investment is sluggish, why good, well-paid jobs are few and far between, and
why relative incomes have fallen, the answer is often to single out state
government itself as a major cause. Consistently, the state is accused of being
"anti-business" and responsible for generating an adverse "business climate." It is
said that the state has pre-empted productive private resources, grown too large,
imposed strangling regulations, taxed too heavily, and discouraged worker
motivation by paying "too high" rates of welfare support.
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Such arguments are by no means new. In 1830, for instance, it was said that the
policy of state corporation laws was the cause of the general business stagnation
then current in Massachusetts.(15) In 1922, an Associated Industries of
Massachusetts article entitled "What Can We Do To Prevent Unwise Social
Legislation" argued against a legislative proposal to extend workingmen's
compensation because it would "... .unduly hamper business management."(16)Mean-
while, in 1958, the General Electric Company, in a letter to 30,000 employees,
blamed over-legislation and overspending by the state legislature for the loss of
21,000 jobs in the Commonwealth over the previous year.(17)
More recently, similar arguments were used by the administration of Governor
Dukakis. In discussing Massachusetts' poor industrial performance, one Dukakis
report asserted that "the increasing costs of state and local government have
placed an added burden on firms wishing to expand in, relocate to, or simply
continue operation in Massachusetts.(18) That administration used such arguments
to cutback on state social services programs and to justify increased aid to
business.(19)
The same type of arguments have also been accepted, indeed promoted, by the
present administration of Governor Edward King. On March 27, 1979, for instance,
the Governor announced the formation of "a special commission aimed at cutting
governmental red tape that may be slowing business expansion in Massachusetts."(20)
Earlier, the Governor had been quoted as saying "the fastest growing industry in
Massachusetts is inefficient government."( 2 1) Governor King, particularly in his
commitment to reduce property taxes by $500,000,000 without cutting services, has
repeatedly emphasized that business is being curtailed through high taxation and
that once rates are lowered, expansion will occur.
Of course, other reasons besides the negative role of state government are often
given to account for the problems of the Massachusetts economy. In 1976, An
Economic Development Program for Massachusetts identified three other causes in
addition to the increasing burden of state and local government on firms. These
were, first, the high costs of energy and of shipping products to and through
Massachusetts; second, the cutbacks in defense space programs which hit the
Commonwealth's research and development firms; and, finally, a relatively high
demand for jobs. Besides these, some other frequently listed causes include
changing markets, poor management and investment decisions, bad labor relations,
capital shortages and biases in federal policies.( 2 2)
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However, notwithstanding all these other possibilities, for Governor King, the
prime fault lies quite clearly with state government. The Governor has stressed:
"We can no longer blame our location, relative energy costs and federal policies for
our economic problems. We have to blame a long history of self-imposed obstacles.
Obstacles we can no longer tolerate."(23)
Implications of these explanations
The problem with these arguments is not that they are necessarily untrue, but that
they do not go deep enough in explaining the fundamental causes of the changes and
problems in the state's economy. The implication of laying primary blame on such
factors as over-taxation by the state is the notion that these problems can largely
be resolved through policies of tax incentives and tax breaks. Equally, blaming
"externalities" or "market failures" such as high energy costs, biased federal
policies or poor management decisions leads to the conclusion that all that is
needed are "market perfecting" devices to correct these imbalances and that these
should take such forms as lowering business costs (usually through tax cuts) or
providing technical assistance to business. However, as subsequent chapters will
try to show, because the advocates of these policies have misassigned cause, these
types of policies are unlikely to have a substantial effect.
Moreover, the arguments which blame the state government are not simply
secondary in fact, but also profoundly misleading in explaining the Commonwealth's
relative decline. Rather than being negative or anti-business, one of the overriding
roles of the state government has been to facilitate the very conditions for the
accumulation of capital. There is strong historic evidence, and also strong
contemporary evidence, to support this assertion.
Significantly, the arguments that the state government must share a major part of
the blame for the Commonwealth's problems are not made only from outside the
machinery of government; the arguments have been made and accepted inside, too,
as Governor King exemplifies. But he is not the first. To an extent, this reflects
the electoral aspirations of many politicians. By attaching cause to state
government, it allows them to claim in their campaigns that they can resolve the
state's economic problems, or - to use the catchword of King's campaign - that they
"can do." If those problems abate, they can then seek the credit. The net effect of
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focusing all this blame (and sometimes credit) on the state is to remove public
attention from more deeply rooted causes. Moreover, there is reinforcement of a
poor self-image upon the state and its personnel; this strengthens notions that the
state does no more, and cannot do more, than simply sit atop the private enterprise
market, to either burden and obstruct it or remove itself and let business grow
free.
The deeper causes
If the conventional explanations are less than accurate, then two questions
immediately arise. First, what are the more fundamental causes of Massachusetts'
relative decline? Second, if the actions of state government are not a primary
cause of Massachusetts' relative decline, why is it that the state is under such a
severe attack from pro-business forces both outside the State House and within?
It is these kinds of questions which the following chapters will address. To do so,
the focus will be on the relationship between the machinery of state government
and the growth, maturity and relative decline of the state's economy. The analysis
will be firmly historical because this will provide not only an understanding of the
events which have led to the current situation, but also illustrate the continuity of
the structural relationship between the state and capital. But the argument will
not be that the state itself is a prime cause in Massachusetts' relative decline,
except in the important sense of "non-decision": this is to say that if state
government had been able to make some decisions which to date have been deemed
to be unthinkable or impractical, then events might have turned differently. In this
light, in no way is this document a defense of the state government; it is highly
critical both of previous and current state policy postures in Massachusetts and of
the motives behind many of the present day attacks.
Thus, rather than blaming the state, the argument will stress that what is at work
is a more fundamental process of uneven economic development which is affecting
not just Massachusetts nor New England but, indeed, the United States itself. At
times in the past, this process of uneven development led to parts of Massachusetts
becoming relatively more economically developed than many other sections of the
United States. Now, through basically the same process, these orginally more
advanced areas have declined, and other parts of both Massachusetts and regions
elsewhere are today at the leading edge of economic development. Hence both
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growth and decline, and wealth and poverty, are the outcomes of this uneven
developmental process, and it simultaneously results in, and is the product of,
social conflict. Currently, the United States in general, and Massachusetts and
much of the old Northeast in particular, are suffering adversely from the
consequences of uneven development. This retrenchment is, essentially, what
underlies the attacks on state government: it is part of what has been called
"recapitalization" - the restructuring, through the means of the state, of the
relationships between capital and labor in the light of declining economic
performance.(24)
In the context of this alternative explanation, the document will examine the
policies now being followed or advocated by the Commonwealth to revitalize its
economy. It will be shown that not only will those policies do little which would
not have been done anyway, but that they often are a misuse of public resources
which could well have been applied more usefully in the form of direct public
investment or social services.
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LOWELL IN 1979. DESPITE URBAN REVITALIZATION EFFORTS, MANY OLD MILL
BUILDINGS ARE NOW EMPTY AND DECAYING.
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CHAPTER 2
THE STATE AND THE ECONOMY
Introduction
The development of state government began in 1629 in Massachusetts when a royal
charter of incorporation was granted to the "Governor and Company of the
Massachusetts Bay in Newe England." In 1630, the first General Court of all
freemen met-these were men who had worked off the indentures they had entered
into with Massachusetts businessmen to finance their trip from England.(1) And
right from the moment of its formation, the General Court involved itself in the
economy of the fledgling state.
For example, the early General Court regulated inventions through a patent system
based on seventeenth century English patent principles, which gave exclusive
personal use of new inventions. Adopted in the "Body of Liberties" of
Massachusetts by the General Court in 1641, the patent law said that "there should
be no monopolies but of such inventions as were profitable to the country, and that
for a short time only."(2)
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One of the first applicants for exclusive privilege under this patent law was Joseph
Jenckes, who wanted permission to undertake a new application of water power to
mills. On May 6th, 1646, the General Court resolved:
"In answer to the peticion of Joseph Jenckes, for liberty to make experience
of his abilities and inventions for ye making of Engines for Mills to goe with
water for ye more speedy dispatch of worke than formerly, and mills for ye
making of Sithes and other Edged tooles, with a new invented Saw-mill, that
things may be afforded cheaper than formerly, and that for fowerteen years
without disturbance by any others setting up the like inventions, so that his
study and cost may not be in vayne or lost; this peticion is granted so as
power is still left to restrain ye exportation of such manufactures, and to
moderate ye prizes thereof if occasion so requires."( 3)
This resolution is highly significant because within it there lie several keys to
understanding what has happened to the Massachusetts economy from that early
time until the present day, for it illustrates:
. the drive to make things more cheaply-a reflection of the more
fundamental drive to maintain and increase profits;
. the drive, as part of this search for profits, to replace labor power with
machines and then to replace simple machines with more complex ones
and, eventually, with systems of mass production;
. the intertwined relationship between the state and the owners of machines
and capital.
The last point is particularly relevant because capital is invested in a market
economy not only where it is most profitable, but also where it is secure. For
Joseph Jenkes, the General Court was clearly ensuring he would be able to keep
control over the gains his invention might bring him, although-as was the ethic of
the time-the court retained power to "moderate ye prizes" if necessary.
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As we shall see, it was the drive to maintain and increase returns and to develop
new profitable sectors in the economy that originally underlay the industrialization
movement in Massachusetts in the early nineteenth century. Much later, however,
after a period of intense expansion of industry in the state-an expansion which had
caused entire communities to arise around manufacturing plants-this same basic
search for higher returns led these early industries to rationalize and relocate their
production. Because of the resistance of settled workers, it was easier to close or
run down sites in the older industrial areas and build new factories based on new
technologies and newly assembled work forces in the suburbs, in the south, or
abroad.
As this complex process of industrialization, deindustrialization and conflict
between labor and capital has unfolded in Massachusetts, we shall see as well that
state government has played a central role. The relationship has truly been an
intertwined one. In the first decades of the new post-colonial Commonwealth, the
state was decisive in the establishment of canals, roads, railways, banks, business
corporations, and labor laws. As the Massachusetts economy has changed and
undergone decline in its traditional industries in the twentieth century, the state
has stepped in to try to improve the Commonwealth's competitive position and to
encourage new, more profitable sectors such as high technology, research and
services. Yet, the state's role has never been simply to aid the owners of capital;
more often than not, there has been conflict over what the state should do, and-at
various times-it has itself been an arena of struggle between farmers, merchants,
workers, industrialists, consumers and commerical interests.
The rest of this chapter details some of the more important parts of this process of
economic development, conflict and state intervention in Massachusetts. Although
the state's economy has developed unevenly, with very many ups and downs, the
analysis will identify four broad periods:(4)
the mercantile period-lasting through to the 1820s
the transition to industry-1812-1860s
the industrial economy-1860-1914
the corporate economy-1918+
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It is important to remember, however, that the major changes and struggles which
have occurred in the Massachusetts economy over the last two centuries have not
taken place in isolation from what has happened in the rest of the American
economy and, indeed, the world. While in the following account some of the key
links are made between events in Massachusetts and elsewhere, it is left to the
succeeding chapter to fully analyze these inter-relationships and the forces
underlying them.
The Mercantile Period and the Growth of Merchant Capital
Before the Revolution, most of the colonists in Massachusetts lived off the land. In
Dedham, for instance, 85 percent of the early inhabitants were farmers and "most
of the rest derived the greater part of their support from the land."(5) Nonetheless,
during this period there were two other significant groups of people who were not
farmers.
First, there were small numbers of wage earners, typically artisans or craftsmen-
such as blacksmiths, cordwainers and millers-who owned their own workshops and
tools. These remained a small group because of the state's sparcity of population,
its dependence on England for many goods, and because most material needs (e. g.,
for shoes, carpentry, or clothes) could be met within the farmer's domestic
household.
Second, there was an increasingly important class of merchants who, based mainly
in Boston, had established a long-distance trade importing goods into the colonies
and selling fish, furs, lumber, cattle and foodstuffs to Virginia, the West Indies and
England. As this carrying trade grew, these merchants became increasingly
wealthy. Whereas in 1687, the richest 5 percent of Boston's merchants owned 27
percent of the city's taxable property, by 1771 they owned 44 percent.(6)
The key functions of colonial government during this period were "to control wages
and prices, maintain the quality of manufactured goods, prevent idleness, relieve
economic distress and .. .enforce the mutual obligations of master and servant." (7)
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For example, the seventeenth century General Court believed strongly in the idea
of the "just price" and set prices on commodities and wages. Both secular and
religious sanctions were imposed on those who violated the general norms of fair
dealing. In addition to this central control of business activity, the early General
Court tried to stabilize the social structure by such means as prescribing codes of
dress to keep people in their "proper place."(8 ) However, as commercial activities
grew, the merchants found all this too constraining and became "instrumental in
subverting the Holy Commonwealth, overthrowing the semi-feudal Puritan
leadership, and transforming the colonial economy, social structure and ideology."(9)
The major juncture in this transition was, of course, the break with Britain. The
War of Independence not only ended the colonial subservience of the states to the
mercantile interests of England, it also heightened the struggle within
Massachusetts between old ideas and new ones-a struggle which matched a
traditional agrarian economy against a rising mercantile class.(10)
As Oscar and Mary Handlin comment:
"The dissolution of imperial authority of 1774 hurled Massachusetts Society
into a period of violent flux. As the government (British) collapsed beneath
the weight of popular insurrection, and as a series of de facto administrations
carried on the work of ruling, complex forces struggled to determine the
character of the state that would arise from the revolutionary effort."(11)
On one side were the farmers, who raised the question of whether commerce should
be an important part of the new state's economy. Many resented trade which
brought profits only to the seaboard and seemed to produce a glut of imports, drain
away money and subject the state to foreign influence. On the other side there
were the merchants, but they were in a complex position because of the debts
Massachusetts had incurred to finance the Revolutionary War. To help pay back
these debts, the anti-commerce farmers wanted to tax foreign trade, which the
merchants obviously resisted. Yet, at the same time, the merchants were also the
major creditors of the state's debt notes. Without further tax revenues, the
merchants could not be repaid. The farmers would not accept any additional
property taxes, so the merchants agreed to indirect taxation of foreign imports if
domestic goods were taxed too. The net effect of this was to tax the farmers both
as producers and consumers, while leaving the merchants free to export.(1 2 ) Despite
some very severe ups and downs in the post-colonial Massachusetts economy, the
merchant class prospered: by 1790, the richest 10 percent of Boston's property
holders owned 65 percent of the city's wealth.(1 3 )
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The Transition to Manufacturing
Small-scale manufacturing had long existed in Massachusetts, dating back almost to
the foundation of the Bay State-as the General Court's grant of patent to Joseph
Jenkes in 1646 to make agriculture tools indicates. Largely this manufacturing was
craft-based, with a master blacksmith, cordwainer, printer or carpenter owning his
own shop and tools and perhaps employing one or two journeymen or apprentices.
In the eighteenth century, some colonial towns did erect large buildings with
hundreds of spinning wheels and looms to employ indigent woment and children. (14)
But these early forebears of the mills were limited in scope and purpose:
essentially, they were established as part of the colonial state's duty to prevent
idleness and relieve economic distress. It was not until the beginning of the
nineteenth century that the power-driven mill, financed by merchant capital, first
appears to mark the foundation of the modern manufacturing system in
Massachusetts.
In this transition to a manufacturing economy, the state played a fundamental
stimulative role. For example:
. 1786 - the General Court aided the start-up of cotton textile
manufacturing by giving a grant of $200 to Barrs from Scotland to help
build a textile machine.
. 1787 - the General Court gave exclusive rights for 15 years to a Boston
company to manufacture glass in Massachusetts. The capital stock of the
company was exempted from taxes for five years and the workmen
employed absolved from military duties.
. 1787 - the legislature chartered the Beverly Cotton Manufacture, which
used spinning Jennies designed to state specifications.
. 1792 - A Dr. Manning received financial assistance from the General
Court and land from Ipswich town to build an experimental wind-powered
manufactory (it failed in 1800).
. 1804 - the General Court granted a 5-year tax emption to the Pawtucket
Cotton and Oil Company, Rehoboth.(15)
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The drive to initiate manufacturing in Massachusetts came largely from a few
merchants who began to realize the gains to be made from manufacturing goods
like shoes and textiles directly rather than'importing them from Britain, as had
been the pattern throughout the 1790s and early 1800s. The 1807 Embargo, the
1810 Non-Intercourse Act and the War of 1812 gave these efforts a huge boost, as
did the actions of government, both at the federal and state level. Early
manufacturing was "endowed with a quasi-public and not a private character, and
given numerous encouragements by the State."(16)
For instance, between the end of the Revolution and 1801, more than 300 business
corporations were created throughout the new nation by state governments,
whereas there had been perhaps only half-a-dozen before. About 200 of these were
inland navigation, toll bridge and turnpike road corporations; 32 were insurance
companies; and 36 were involved in water resource projects and dock building. (17)
This governmental intervention continued into the nineteenth century with the
opening up of the midwest. With federal blessing and participation, the states
developed transportation links which pierced the Appalachians and enabled the
creation of the new midwest markets-and the exploitation of that region's
resources. These projects included the Erie Canal (New York State, 1817), the
Pennsylvanian canal system (1825), the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal (Maryland,
Virginia and the Federal Government, 1827), and state-pioneered railway ventures
(Baltimore and Ohio, 1828; Erie, 1830s).(18)
The opening up of more fertile and profitable agricultural lands, in western New
York and then in the midwest, throughout the first parts of the nineteenth century
forced many farm families off the less competitive land in New England. The
effect was to create a surplus of labor which could be used in manufacturing in the
Bay State. At the same time, the decline of foreign commerce caused by
Jefferson's Embargo and the War of 1812 with Britain, encouraged merchants with
capital to look for investments aside from shipping. A number of cotton mills had
been established in the years before the turn of the century - in Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and, as already mentioned, In Massachusetts. Sometimes, mercantile
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capital was used to finance these ventures: for example, in the 1790s, merchant
Moses Brown formed a partnership, which included Samuel Slater, to introduce
Arkwright spinning machines in the Pawtucket Mill, Rhode Island, But, more often,
mills were family-owned, using minimal capital. With the trade restrictions with
Britain in the early nineteenth century, these small mills proliferated: by 1810,
there were 238 mills in America, including 54 in Massachusetts.(19)
However, developments were at hand which would fundamentally change the
character of this textile industry. In 1813, a group of import merchants established
the Boston Manufacturing Company in Waltham. Using a power loom, the mill was
". . .the first fully integrated factory in which all processes from raw material to
finished product were powered under one roof."(2 0) Large economies resulted, and
the mill was very profitable. Unlike the small family producers, the merchants
were able to finance the huge capital costs - about $400,000 - of such a mill.
Moreover, in the depression following the War of 1812, Boston Manufacturing, with
its large capital reserves, was able to expand production, whereas small family
mills throughout New England were forced to close. The model was clearly a
successful one: it influenced other merchants to invest in additional mills along
water power sites in northern Massachusetts.
But, just as there had been popular struggles against foreign commerce
immediately after the Revolution, there was also opposition in Massachusetts (as in
other states) towards the growth of home-based industry. The Commonwealth's
population was still predominantly comprised of small farmers, artisans and
craftsmen who made their living, and acquired their ideas and values, from the
traditional argarian economy. The pivot of social and economic life was the family
farm. Against this, the new manufacturing jarred, altering customary notions of
work. Ownership became divided from production, work was not based upon the
land, and the autonomy, initiative and skill characteristic of farming was replaced
by the mechanical tasks required to make standard products. Since many of the
early mills employed women, there was a disruption of traditional sex roles. The
farmers and artisans also feared they would have to pay higher prices for goods
because prominent merchants were advocating tariff barriers to protect their
manufacturing investments.( 2 1)
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Anti-manufacturing agruments were advanced by intellectuals as well. Jefferson,
for instance, was afraid that urban disorder would result from the new class of
property-less dependent uurban workers which manufacturing would set up. Some
sections of the commercial class of bankers, merchants and shippers also opposed
home-based manufacturing, not only through conservatism, but because of a desire
to maintain the viability of their own investments in ships and transportation
facilities.( 2 2 )
The state was at the center of this struggle over manufacturing, for it alone had
the power to charter business corporations and grant such favors as monopoly rights
to protect investments and eminent domain to obtain property and access for
industrial development and canal building. The nascent merchant industrialists
were able, despite the opposition, to get the state to act in their favor. They
argued that manufacturing was of general common benefit, as exemplified by the
Newburyport Woolen Company which, at the turn of the nineteenth century, asked
for state help, not "for private emoluments for themselves" but as "an object
worthy of the Public encouragement."(2 3 ) But, perhaps more significantly, the
merchants had power as major holders of the state's debt notes: indeed, as the
state paid off the public debt (with interest), the large sums released were often
used by merchants as capital to invest in manufacturing ventures.(24)
The degree of success achieved by the merchants in using the state to help develop
manufacturing is indicated in the growth of charters to manufacturing corporations
in Massachusetts, as follows:(2 5)
1789-1796 (8 years) .... 3
1800-1809 (10 years) .... 15
1810-1819 (10 years) .... 133
1820-1829 (10 years) . . . .146
1830-1835 (6 years) .... 100
As the number of mills grew in Massachusetts-and, of course, in other parts of
New England-the way was opened for the wider development of industrial
capitalism. Around the mill sites rose new cities such as Lowell, Chicopee, and
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Lawrence. The proportion of New Englanders living in communities of 10,000 or
more people increased from 7 to 36 percent between 1810 and 1860, while from
1820 to 1860 the population of Massachusetts more than doubled from 500,000 to
1,200,000.(26) Boston broke out from the limitations of a mercantile economy,
which had held its population close to 16,000 in the eighteenth century, to a city of
60,000 by 1830 and 180,000 by 1860. This urbanization increased the specialization
of life: it led to an increasing demand for construction and for shoes, clothing, and
furniture. The growth of textiles also created a new textile machine industry.
Of this dramatic transitional period towards a manufacturing and urban economy in
Massachusetts, the historian Alan Dawley writes:
"After 1814, the dynamics of capitalist development broke apart the old links
between household and marketplace. The search for profits drove Yankee
traders even deeper into the realm of production, causing the emergence of
groups who bought labor as a commodity and the groups who sold their ability
to work to the highest bidder. The half-century after 1814 produced an
economic transformation that eventuated in the industrial revolution based on
the factory system."(27)
The essential development of this transitional period was the eclipse of, first, craft
trades undertaken by a master or artisan, and subsequently, family-based
manufacturing. In both these traditional modes, ownership, management and
production were usually concurrent. But, as industrialization developed, these
functions became increasingly delinated and separated. At the leading edge of this
transformation was the textile industry: not only did it most clearly distinguish
labor from management and ownership, it also introduced the power-driven
mechanized factory and the female wage earner and fundamentally developed the
corporation and the permanent urban factory class.(28) In addition to becoming
more separated, ownership began to be concentrated. By 1850, fifteen Boston
families-the "Associates," some of whom, as import merchants, had set up the
original Boston Manufacturing Company-controlled 20 percent of the nation's
cotton spindleage, 30 percent of Massachusetts railroad mileage, 39 percent of
Massachusetts insurance capital, and 40 percent of Boston banking resources.(29)
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For the textile industry, it has been shown that this separation of owners from
workers led to "a promotional pattern, which drew its profit not from the
manufacture of cotton, but from the organization of new enterprises."(3 0)In Massa-
chusetts there were extensive stock manipulations, as profits were made on the
model which had generated high returns at Lowell - selling land, water power, and
machinery to new enterprises and stockholders, rather than actually producing
textiles. Between 1820 and 1860, this led to a rapid over-expansion of productive
activity. Moreover, the machinery the owners had developed stressed speed and
efficiency at the expense of flexibility; it could only produce a narrow range of
goods, the market for which soon became glutted. While individual fortunes were
made (and sometimes lost), by 1860 the textile industry in Massachusetts was
structurally weakened with overcapacity, and the seeds sown for its subsequent
decline.(31)
The state aided the accumulation of wealth from manufacturing ventures by
allowing, in 1829, the principle of limited liability, although for some years before
that various reductions of full liability had been permitted by both the legislature
and judiciary. Since, with limited liability, individual investors could not be held
liable for the debts of a company, this protected and attracted investors. But it
also enabled the Boston Associates to invest their own and other people's capital
without risk to their personal fortunes. The state was under pressure to allow
limited liability because, in the 1820s, large sums of capital were leaving
Massachusetts to be invested in manufacturing in Maine and New Hampshire (both
of which had limited liability).( 3 2) Through attempting to stem this outflow by
permitting limited liability, the effect was to further diminsh state control of
corporations in Massachusetts, while advancing and legitimizing corporations as
private instruments of individual shareholders.
In addition to the protection of private capital accumulation in Massachusetts, the
state was fundamentally involved in this period in the development of canals,
turnpikes, bridges and railroads. The state promoted such internal improvements as
a matter of deliberate policy; in so doing, it facilitated the conditions essential for
the growth of manufacturing and, at the same time, provided profit opportunities
for the builders, operators, stockholders and financiers of these projects. In the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, state-chartered bridge corporations
paid high returns, especially when new bridges boosted adjacent real estate values.
For road and canal building, the state allowed corporations to take land and levy
tolls, but in the speculative rush to build, the early canals were not always
profitable to operate, although industrial growth in the 1820s led to better returns.( 3 3 )
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It was, however, in the development of railroads, which began to eclipse the canals
after 1835, where industrialists, bankers and the state worked together, and
sometimes fought each other, most vigorously. The construction of the Boston and
Lowell Railroad, opened in 1835, is a case in point: the railroad was promoted as a
"public good," but really served to profit, through land rights, access to Boston, and
stock manipulation, the Boston Associates and their Locks and Canals Company
(which was developing Lowell); it was chartered and given a monopoly by the
legislature; and it opened the way for a frantic wave of railroad development as the
big mill industrialists and financiers (such as Nathan Appleton) turned railroad
construction, and the buying and selling of railroad stock, into a new area for
capital accumulation.( 34) Aiding these developments, Massachusetts issued $6.5
million of state securities for railroads between 1837 and 1841, increasing this to
$7.3 million by 1860.(35)
Industrial Massachusetts
Just before the Civil War, the main areas of economic activity in Massachusetts
were shoes and leather, textiles, machine-building, metal-working, the extractive
industries (forest, fishery, and quarry products), and manufactured consumer goods.
Shoemaking was the largest, employing over 60,000 people in 1860 or more than 28
percent of the state's labor force.(3 6) The growth of this industry followed national
increases in population and urbanization. From a small eighteenth century cottage
industry in towns such as Lynn, shoemaking expanded to meet rising demand by
developing, first, a structure of home production around central shops (from 1830s)
and, subsequently, a mechanized factory system (after Civil War). Massachusetts
was able to take the lead in shoes because merchant capital was available to
continuously develop, finance and market production; a further factor was the
declining competitiveness of farming in the state, making available the labor
needed to manufacture footwear.( 3 7)
Textiles had the second biggest workforce, with 50,000 workers - although the more
intensively capitalized and mechanized mills exceed in dollar volume the output of
shoe manufacturers.(38) While, in 1860, both textiles and shoemaking were broadly
diffused across the state, a trend was emerging towards concentration in fewer
companies with larger factories. "Local dependence on a particular industry was
fast becoming the rule in many towns."(3 9 )
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At the same time, in the wider American economy a clear, although uneven,
pattern of economic specialization had emerged: the West produced food; the
South, cotton for Northern and English factories; the North, manufactured goods
and the transportation facilities to deliver them. Over the previous decades most
of the funds for building factories, railroads, ships, and canals and for mortgaging
farms and plantations had been supplied by New York and Boston financiers. As a
result, they had garnered the greatest profits, although the South had held on to
national political leadership despite its more limited single-staple, slave economy.
However, as an increasing amount of Southern wealth went to enrich Northern
industrialists, bankers and shippers, and as the North seemed about to take over
politicial supremacy, the leaders of the South decided to secede. The Civil War
ensued; its outcome was the shattering of the Southern economy, while in the North
there was further development and concentration of industrial capital.(40)
After the Civil War, shoemaking continued to grow in Massachusetts, although
mainly through the increased application of capital. The industry moved away from
home-based production to the more intensive and regulated factory system which
the new machines, such as the McKay stitcher required. Textiles also continued to
expand, but the center of production shifted southwards from Lowell and Lawrence
to Fall River and New Bedford. Part of the explanation for this shift lies in the
application of steam power. Steam mills did not have the special, often isolated
and expensive to harness, geographical needs of water power: rather, as one
contemporary newpaper observed: "It is cheaper to use steam power in the midst
of a dense population, than to use water power, which often makes it necessary not
only to build a factory, but a town also."(41) In Fall River, local merchant-
capitalists had built several water-powered mills, but by 1845, they had harnessed
all the available river power. Instead of more costly expansion elsewhere, they
took the profit from the water mills to build a second generation of steam-powered
factories nearby. Without having to bear the costs of workers' housing and using
immigrant labor, Fall River expanded dramatically in the 1860s and 1870s. New
Bedford followed Fall River's example, using steam-powered mills, although it
developed textiles because merchants were looking for new investment
opportunities as whaling declined in the 1850s.(42)
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AFTER THE CIVIL WAR, TEXTILE PRODUCTION GREW IN FALL RIVER AND NEW BEDFORD.
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From 1873 until the mid-1890s, industrial America experienced what was then
called "The Great Depression." As Douglas Dowd comments:
"Unlike the Great Depression of the 1930s, the most prominent feature of the
earlier period was pressure on profits, rather than massive unemployment.
That pressure was due to the steady and dramatic lowering of prices
throughout the period, which was in turn the result of great increases in
efficiency, combined with the inability to cut off domestic or foreign
competition in the context of relatively free trade and relatively competitive
market structures."(43)
In order to maintain profitability under this severe competitive pressure business
resorted to price fixing and trust formation, further applications of technology to
increase labor productivity, and towards the turn of the century, mergers and
combination to avoid competition. Between 1886 and 1905, the size of the hundred
largest firms quadrupled and by 1905, these top firms controlled 40 percent of
America's industrial capital.(44)
Boston financiers were in the forefront of this reorganization and amalgamation of
industry. The American Bell Telephone Company, a holding company which is the
predecessor of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, was created by
Massachusetts state charter in 1880 and financed largely by Massachusetts capital.
The Stone and Webster holding company (electric power construction) was formed
in 1889. In 1892, the Thompson-Hoston Electric Company of Lynn merged with the
Edison Electric Company in New York to form General Electric. Six years later,
eight national banks were merged in Boston to form the National Shawmut Bank.(45)
In the textile industry, conglomerates began to develop, such as the American
Woolen Company which, by the 1900s controlled 26 mills, including the world's
biggest cloth factory in Lawrence (which alone employed 10,000 workers). The
Stevens Company, then still based largely in Massachusetts, also began to acquire
mills during this period. The underlying trend in textiles, as for other industries,
was towards concentration in larger, more productive factories, causing less-
efficient mills to have excess capacity and go out of business.(46) Moreover, in
the 1890s, there were the beginnings of a slow down in the overall growth of
textiles in Massachusetts: in part, this was due to Massachusetts' textile
corporations placing increasing amounts of new investment in the South, rather
than in the Commonwealth.(47)
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As leading Massachusetts' companies during this period grew larger, more
concentrated and more capital-intensive, increasing numbers of workers were
adversely affected. In the metal working industry, for instance, the introduction of
improved machinery allowed firms to hire less skilled workers and phase out the
apprenticeship system. But, despite this increased productivity, machinists' wages
in Massachusetts were virtually unchanged between 1870 and 1900.(48) In addition,
as these large firms concentrated hiring and firing in central personnel
departments, the machinists lost their long-held status as independent sub-
contractors. Meanwhile, in shoemaking, thousands of men and women who had
worked at home or in small independent shopes were displaced as large, mechanized
factories arose in Lynn, Haverhill, Brockton, and Marlboro. In Lynn, in 1875, this
factory system produced 7,000,000 more shoes with 2,000 less workers than it had
done in 1855.(49) Yet, wages still fell: for the shoe industry in Massachusetts
between 1872 and 1881, the average weekly wage dropped by as much as 25 percent
for many workers. Those employed on new machines suffered most, with McKay
sole operators seeing their average wages fall from $22.22 in 1872 to $15.29 in
1898.(50)
However, competition was not the only force shaping capital's search for profit
during this industrial period: there was the development of strong counter-pressure
as groups of workers started to organize themselves into unions. The year of 1860
had seen a bitter six-week General Strike in the shoe industry, as 20,000 workers
demand higher wages and equal pay for women. But, with the help of scab labor
and police power, the employers broke the strike. By 1868, the Lynn shoe workers
had established a union - the Unity Lodge of the Knights of St. Crispin - and, in
1870, they struck against the owner's attempts to enforce a large wage reduction.
The following period saw many more conflicts in the Lynn shoe industry over wages
and hours, including a lock-out in 1872, six wage disputes in 1875, and two very
bitter violent strikes over wages in 1877 and 1878. In this latter struggle,
intervention by the state-in the form of police protection for strikebreakers-
helped force the union into defeat.(51)
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There was also a growth in trade unionism in other industries in the state,
particularly in the machine shops and textile mills. These workers fought many
struggles to lessen the working day and maintain wages. But besides company non-
recognition and police harrassment, the unions were weakened through the
increasing specialization of work which resulted from the growth in capital
investment and technology For the skilled, more organized workers, the
introduction by the employers of unskilled and immigrant labor was competition
and, despite many cases where these unorganized workers did join strikes, a rift
developed between the craft unions and the mass of operatives.
As for state government, the industrial period saw the state (and its sub-units of
municipal government) increasingly stepping in to alleviate the worst aspects of the
living conditions of the now urban labor force. It was concerned to maintain the
health of the working population, which was being threatened by disease, excess
working hours, and abuse of child labor. A Board of Health was set up in 1869 in
Massachusetts, followed ten years later by a Board of Statistics of Labor.(5 2 ) From
the 1870s onward, there were many reports and hearings over conditions in the
factories.(53) The state was also concerned to maintain in order the relations
between labor and capital during the dislocations and conflicts of industrialization
and concentration. In the late 1880s, a state Board of Arbitration was set up to
mediate conflicts, while in 1906, state employment offices were first organized in
Boston, Worcester and Springfield.(54)
After the turn of the century, one of the ways the state intervened to try to
control and diffuse labor militancy was by encouraging suburbanization and private
home ownership. In 1911, the Massachusetts legislature appointed a Homstead
Commission to help redirect workers from the cities to the suburbs and country.
The Commission was founded on the belief that crowded central-city tenements
and districts encouraged a population which ". . .possessed only ephemeral interest
in the welfare of the community, comprising nomads whose mode of existence
acted to the detriment of public health, standards of life, ideals and morals." The
Commission wanted to move workers out of multi-family tenements and into
single-family detached homes because it was convinced that ". . .the private home
and exposure to nature were the sources of physical well-being, and the state's
surest guarantee of good citizenship." In 1913, the Commission sponsored
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legislation through the General Court establishing planning boards in all
communities of 10,000 or more people so as to provide a framework for orderly
private home development; in 1917, an appropriation was obtained from the
legislature to encourage private capital into suburban development by setting up a
demonstration project in Lowell to show that there was a reasonable profit to be
made in erecting private homes for workers.(55)
Thus, the increasing social character of state intervention in industrial
Massachusetts was based not upon abstract and independent ideals; rather,
intervention developed out of labor militancy and the real need to curb and reform
the excesses of the factories and urban slums for the sake of maintaining the
system of private capital as a whole. It was a conflict situation, however, and
employers often opposed reforms. Labor struggles, such as those to reduce the
working day to twelve and then ten hours, to establish minimum wages, and to
decrease child labor, were vehemently fought by industry, both at the point of
production and in the arena of state government.(56) As one commentator, looking
back on this period, remarked:
. .. the relationships between employers and employed have at times in the
past been the source of much discord and disorder, with the resources of
wealth and power pitted against the force of numbers of our great industrial
army. Each session of the Massachusetts Legislature has seen the
representatives of these forces contending one against the other, for and
against proposed statutory changes for the benefit, or otherwise, of the
working people."(57)
At the same time as the social character of state intervention in the industrial
period in Massachusetts was growing, the ground rules for its economic
interventions were dramatically changing. With the concentration and
centralization of private economic power in this half-century, the state could no
longer retain the kind of direct oversight of business it had undertake in the first
half. The large corporations now far outstripped state government. In the late
1880s, for example, one Boston-based railroad employed 18,000 people, had gross
receipts of about $40,000,000 a year, and paid salaries of up to $35,000. The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the other hand, employed only 6,000 persons
had gross receipts of about $7,000,000, and paid maximum salaries of $6,500. (58)
Richard Hofstadter remarks that "the state governments were now relatively small
enough to become the fiefs of the (large) corporations."(59)
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Strikers outside the
gate of the Merrimack
Mill, Lowell, 1912.
I 'Big' Bill Hayward(of the I.W.W.) with
strikers, Lowell, 1912.
STRONG COUNTER-PRESSURE TO CAPITAL'S SEARCH FOR PROFITS CAME AS WORKERS ORGANIZED.
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The Corporate Economy
By the end of World War I, the basis of the modern American economy - that is to
say, the modern corporation-was essentially in place. The leading sectors of this
corporate economy were the technologically advanced industries of oil, steel,
automobiles, electrical engineering and chemicals. The development of these
industries was accompanied by rapid growth in institutions of banking and financial
services. However, the economy of Massachusetts, despite the claim made by the
Associated Industries of Massachusetts in 1923 that it was still "the industrial
leader" of the U. S., depended very largely on traditional mill-based industries. (60)
In that year, over half of the state's 600,000 manufacturing workers worked either
in textiles (255,000) or boots, shoes and leather (88,000). The next decades would
see some very severe changes as the Commonwealth was forced to adapt to the
facts of life of the new corporate economy, changes whose costs bore heavily on
hundreds of thousands of workers and whose repercussions are still with us today.
The year of 1923, in fact, marks the peak of industrial employment and production
in Massachusetts in the inter-war period. After that year, there was almost
continuous decline, except for a slight increase in the value of products between
1927 and 1929, and some recovery after the low of the depression in 1933. This is
shown in the following figures:(6 1)
Manufacturing 1923 1929 1933 1937
Establishments 10,519 9,872 8,145 8,718
Wage earners 667,172 557,494 398,592 498,602
Total wages * 779.3 694.8 345.5 559.2
Value of products* 3,570.5 3,392.2 1,668.7 2,623.1
(*millions of dollars)
These figures show that the economy in Massachusetts was experiencing decline
before the onslaught of the Great Depression. Between 1919 and 1929, the state
lost 2,035 industrial establishments and nearly 157,000 jobs, despite the fact that
the 1920's was a "prosperity decade." The heaviest losses were in the
Commonwealth's leading industries-cotton goods (57 establishments and 52,000
jobs lost) and boots and shoes (132 establishments and 27,900 jobs lost). These same
years saw the loss of 110 foundry and machine shops, although "only" 6,500 jobs
were lost.(62 )
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X = mill liquidated or removed
COTTON MILLS LIQUIDATED OR REMOVED FROM MASSACHUSETTS, 1923-1940.
(As listed in: Report of the Special Commission Relative to the
Textile Industry and to Prevent the Removal Thereof from the
Commonweal th, House No. 2590, Comm. of Mass. , 1950).
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What was beginning to gain momentum during the twenties in Massachusetts was a
process of industrial restructuring, both economically and spatially - a process
which was itself based in a re-establishment of the relations between capital and
labor. In the industrial period in Massachusetts, as in other parts of America, the
tendencies were for manufacturing capital to become more concentrated and
centralized. But in the late manufacturing and corporate eras, without becoming
economically less concentrated, capital began to shift geographically. Although in
1929, twelve leading industrial cities in Massachusetts still produced-according to
value-64 percent of all goods manufactured in the Commonwealth's cities,
excluding the city of Boston, during the years between 1880 and 1920, most of them
experienced population decline.(6 3 ) The reason was the loss of manufacturing
plants and jobs: industry was beginning to decentralize and recentralize. Between
1919 and 1929, manufacturing employment dropped from 36,650 to 23,100 in
Lawrence; from 31,200 to 17,100 in Lowell; from 38,500 to 26,400 in Fall River;
and from 44,200 to 32,100 in New Bedford.( 6 4 )
One of the forms recentralization took-particularly in textiles-was the "runaway
shop"-employers moving their business out of the region. Nonetheless, the decline
and recentralization of industry was due much more to bankruptcies and
liquidations rather than actual migrations.( 6 5) Any new capital which was being
invested in the state-and there was some-tended to avoid the congested and
conflict-scarred old central city locations.
With the stock market crash in 1929, economic conditions worsened in the
Commonwealth. Two-thirds of the entire workforce were jobless in Lowell in 1930,
while for the state as a whole, the 1934 official unemployment rates were 25
percent among whites and 40 percent for blacks.( 6 6 ) The President of the United
Textile Workers Union, Thomas McMahon, commented: "There is perhaps more
destitution and misery in the mill towns of New England today . . .than anywhere
else in the United States."(6 7 )
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STRIKERS DEMONSTRATE IN MERRIMACK ST., LOWELL, 1912.
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In relative terms, the depression hit Massachusetts harder than other industrial
states. In 1921, the Commonwealth ranked fifth among all states in terms of the
value of product output; by 1935, Massachusetts had fallen to eighth position.(6 8)Be-
tween 1922 and 1938, the capitalization of industrial corporations in the
Commonwealth declined from $2.8 billion to $1.7 billion-a 38 percent drop.(69)
There was some recovery in 1936, but even so, the underlying decline in
manufacturing in the state continued to right up to the start of the war.
For working people, the years after the First World War were traumatic ones; these
were times of conflict and militancy, but also-in the face of state and corporate
power and economic depression-times of defeat, humiliation and misery. Just
after the end of the war, textile workers throughout New England began to
campaign for an eight-hour day. The employers would only agree to cut hours if
pay was reduced-which for the mass of already low-paid, unskilled mostly
immigrant workers was intolerable. In 1919, seven years after the great textile
strike of 1912, workers in Lawrence struck for a shorter work week with no
reduction in pay. The strike spread to textile centers throughout the region,
including New Bedford and Fall River. Although the strikers were opposed by the
leadership of the (skilled) United Textile Workers and were harrassed-frequently
violently-by the police, after ten weeks the workers gained their demands.(70)
One contemporary commentator on this strike wrote:
"(it) is a strike for wages carried on in a revolutionary atmosphere. That is,
there are serious questionings of the justice of the existing economic order.
In addition to that, there is a feeling on the part of the strikers that the
government is against them. . .to many of them American government is
personified by the Lawrence police."(71)
Worker resistance continued throughout the twenties in the textile industry,
particularly in opposition to the owners' attempts to introduce labor-saving
machinery, speed-ups, and wages cuts. The employers' response in their search to
maintain profitability was twofold:
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. First, they tried to break the unions and weaken worker organization: a
program of selected shutdowns was introduced in the mills, often lasting
months, which forced workers to leave and dispersed union leaders; they
accused unions of being "foreign" and "un-American," thereby fanning the
"red scare" hysteria of the time; and, when strikes occurred, they were
not above calling upon the police to help break up pickets. In conscious
support of the employers' strategy, the state mounted its own attacks on
labor and political organizers (eg: its support of the Palmer raids and the
case of Sacco and Vanzetti).
. Second, and most important, they increasingly used the strategy of
decentralizing their capital. On the one hand, they moved or threatened
to move shops to the South. But, much more significantly, they did not
replace their capital in Massachusetts-rather, they reinvested it in new
production technology in the South.(72)
The object of this decentralization strategy was to create and take advantage of a
new Southern labor force. Coming off the farms, these workers had less of an
industrial history and consciousness. This meant they were non-unionized, lacking
customary notions of what was skilled and unskilled work, and willing to work for
lower wages. It was thus easier for the mill-owners to introduce new technologies
and production methods using cheaper labor. In addition, the lack of history of
workers' struggle in these southern states meant the owners were relatively
unencumbered by labor legislation or taxation to provide for workers' "social wage."
In the boot and shoe industry, the picture was similar. One survey shows that
between 1919 and 1927, Massachusetts lost 205 million dollars in value of boot and
shoe products, twenty-four plants and 24,180 jobs, although overall U. S. output
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remained fairly constant in dollar value during this period. The survey went on to
explain:
"The agitation of organized labor has been given in many instances as the
reason for the removal or liquidation of our shoe factories. Special emphasis
has been placed by those interviewed upon the inefficient leadership of labor
agents and the uneconomic requirements placed upon industry in the
settlement of problems or disputes. In many of the labor contracts are to be
found clauses prohibiting the employment of current practices developed as
part of modern scientific management and applied to job analysis and wage
setting."(73 )
One of the effects of the Great Depression in the 1930s was to intensify all these
trends. In 1934, there were massive nationwide uprisings against the employers'
attempts, backed by the federal government, to cut back wages and numbers of
workers. The United Textile Union organized the workers to resist-but they were
met, on the employers' request, by large forces of police and state national
guardsmen. Confrontations occurred in Lowell and Lawrence, while in Dighton,
police with shotguns turned away pickets. In other American textile areas-
especially in Rhode Island but also in the South-strikes and strike-breakers faced
particular violence. The forceful intervention of the states ultimately forced the
strikers into submission-and also smashed the first attempts by southern workers
to unionize.(74)
For Massachusetts, the Depression hit hard. The Commonwealth was still
dependent on mill-based industries, but the strategy of capital decentralization had
left these with older, less efficient machinery. The state's mills and factories were
thus often first to lose or go out of production and, when recovery came, last to
restart-indeed, most never restarted.
Although the advent of the Second World War gave a short boost to the
Commonwealth's textile and footwear industries, in the post-war years an
unremitting decline continued. The runaway shops kept running and capital
continued to decentralize from old urban areas-but now going increasingly to low-
wage Third World countries, as well as to the South.(75) By 1975, the
Commonwealth's traditional industries were a remnant of their former importance;
textiles employed just 25,000 workers and the footwear industry 22,000. Between
1960 and 1978, at least 95 major textile plants closed, with a loss of 20,000 jobs,
while 143 major boot and shoe plants closed, losing 27,000 jobs.( 7 6 )
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If the demise of the traditional industries has been one structural change in the
corporate era of the Massachusetts economy, another has been the development of
the "high technology" sector. But this sector is not quite so new as is often
thought: even in 1923, the electrical machinery industry was the Commonwealth's
third biggest employer, with 26,400 workers; and even then, technological
institutions-especially MIT-were working closely with corporations in these
advanced industries.(78) World War II gave the sector a major push and, by 1947,
the electrical and electronics industry employed 60,000 workers. In 1967, at the
height of the Vietnam War, employment reached 104,000. However, the path to
this peak was by no means smooth. From 1947-1950, employment in the industry
grew by 7.8%; in the next three years, spurred by the Korean War, it jumped by
41.3% to 91,400; but with the ending of the war and subsequent recession,
employment dropped to 81,900 in 1955. Employment peaked again at 98,600 in
1960 (the Sputnik era), fell to 83,100 in 1964, and then, fuelled by the Vietnam
escaltion, grew to its 1967 high. After that year, employment declined particularly
with the sharp defense cutbacks and general recession of the early 1970s. In 1972,
employment fell to 83,700, but has since gained some ground to around 90,000
workers now.(79)
In the development of this high technology sector in Massachusetts, state
government played two significant roles. First, it facilitated the expansion of
centers of advanced education and research-such as MIT and Harvard. Although
much of this expansion was financed through the federal government, the state
aided it through granting property tax exemptions to these universities. Secondly,
it facilitated the creation of new advanced industrial and research complexes on
the periphery of the old industrial areas through the building of Route 128 and
other highways. Route 128 was started in 1951 and "within a relatively few years
the highway had been nationally recognized as the classic example of the
stimulating effects of road construction on industrial development in suburban
areas." By 1961, there were 306 companies adjacent to Route 128.(80)
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The new industries which located along the highway were largely based on
electronics and instruments. But, very importantly, industrial production was not
the only activity which was developed, although it was responsible for most new
jobs. A 1957 survey showed that while distribution (e. g. warehousing) employed
12% of workers along Route 128, it was responsible for 44% of the total number of
plants; production accounted for 41% of the plants, but 73% of jobs; and research
and development and services accounted for the remainder.( 8 1) Moreover, the
growth of plants and jobs was not confined to Route 128. It also pushed north along
Routes 93 and 3, west along Routes 2 and 9, and south along Route 1-all of these
newly constructed. New housing developments were rapidly fostered, together with
the construction of shopping centers and, in general, a rapid suburbanization.
Between 1950 and 1960, the population in the area lying between Route 128 on the
east, Route 495 on the west, and Routes 2 and 9 grew from 173,140 to 267,390,
or 54.4%.(82) This was six times the growth rate in the state as a whole. What
was happening, therefore, was not so much the creation of circumferential
industrial belt around Boston or even a spread of growth along the major highways,
but rather the creation of several major new industrial and consumption complexes
such as Waltham-Newton and Lowell-Andover.
In this restructuring of brand new series of industrial spaces, there were also new
relationships developed between, first, labor and capital and, second, production
and consumption. The workers employed were either highly qualified professionals
or semi-skilled, mostly female, assembly workers in modern production
environments: in both cases, they were-literally-miles away from the history,
customs, work rules, and aged buildings and machines of urban mills and factories.
In the new suburban areas, there was increased privatization and specialization of
space: the (single-family) house was separated from other houses, homes were
separated from workplaces, and aspects of communal life-such as shopping or
recreation-split into discrete parts.
-48-
FORMER PLANT
ROUTE 128 PLANT
DURING THE 1950's AND 1960's, THE STATE HELPED TO CREATE NEW
CENTERS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY - AS ALONG ROUTE 128.
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Consequences of Changes
In the fundamental, often traumatic changes and transformations of the
Massachusetts' over the last two centuries, we have seen that the state has
consistently played a central role. It is, of course, true that nowadays the state's
interventions have been increasingly aided, and at times taken over, by federal
power and money. At the same time, it is also true that labor and popular
movements have struggled against the state and tried to use it, through the
democratic machinery, for their own advancement. But these elaborations do not
fundamentally change the basic point that, throughout, the state in Massachusetts
has been key in the promotion of capital accumulation, and in the maintenance and,
when necessary, the restructuring of the relationships between labor and capital.
The ways by which the state has done this have changed over time, varying with
economic, political and social conditions. But, as this chapter has shown, amongst
them have been: direct intervention to develop manufacturing and to provide
economically vital infrastructure (e g. roads, canals, bridges and railroads);
protection of private property rights and facilitation of the private corporation;
protection of certain monopolies, especially in the formative years of
industrialization; planning, facilitating and financing industrial and residential
decentralization to suburban locations; opening up, through initiatives like Route
128 (and also urban renewal and revitalization) new areas for capital accumulation;
quelling labor conflict and regulating both employed and unemployed labor; and
reducing the most manifestly disruptive and exploitive aspects of capital
accumulation.
We have seen too that the changes and developments facilitated by the state have
caused, as well as resulted from, conflict at the point of production and within
whole industries, cities and towns, and the institutions of state government. The
underlying drive has been the unremitting search for profit - a search which has led
both to industrialization and deindustrialization, to urban concentration and
suburban decentralization, to the introduction of new technology and to its
subsequent obsolescence, and to the development of an industrial working class and
then to its deskilling and displacement. In this complex process, it stands out that
private capital has had no permanent commitment to any particular place,
technology, or group of workers. While Massachusetts has experienced huge capital
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investments which have generated industrial growth and development, it has also
seen capital disinvested to create industrial decline and decay. The signs of this
disinvestment are everywhere evident in practically all of the Commonwealth's
older cities - empty and under-utilized factories, vacant land, deteriorated housing,
and unemployed and under-employed workers.
But industrial change has not been the only element in the Commonwealth's
economic transformation. There has also been a growth, particularly in the post-
World War II years, of new, non-manufacturing activities. Between 1951 and 1977,
the number of service jobs increased by 261,000; finance, insurance and real estate
expanded by 215,100 jobs; the wholesale and retail sector took on an extra 169,700
workers; and government jobs grew by 174,000. Many of these new jobs are in
professional or highly skilled occupations and pay well. But the bulk of the new
work has been low skill, routine and low paid (as in many retail, clerical and service
jobs) or work which, although interesting and socially valuable, has not been
correspondingly well paid (as in child care, social work and health care.) In 1977,
the average annual wage in service occupations in Massachusetts was $9,524; in
finance, insurance and real estate, it was $11,814; and in wholesale and retail jobs,
it was $8,271. By comparison, the average annual wage in manufacturing was
$12,686 in 1977, while the official lower living income standard for a family of four
was $11,481.(83)
Thus, not only have the new technological industries failed to fully replenish the
jobs lost and the neighborhoods degraded by the collapse of the old industries; there
has also been a failure on the part of the new non-manufacturing activities to
provide a sufficient number of good, well-paying jobs. In sum, an increased
polarization has developed: traditional blue-collar jobs have been lost, to be
replaced (for some) by high-wage, high skill or professional jobs, but (for many) by
low-wage, less-skilled work. For others, particularly youth, minorities and women,
there have been no jobs at all.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FORCES OF CHANGE
The explanations given for the changes in Massachusetts' economic structure and,
in particular, for the decline of its traditional manufacturing base often suggest
that the state has been a victim of its own history, geography, and politics. These
interpretations typically run along the following lines:
"Massachusetts, being an area which was settled early and possessing ports
well-suited for trade with the Old World, was bound to be one of the first
states to develop industrially. But as soon as the movement to the
interior began and the South and West opened up for economic
development, then Massachusetts was bound to lose its early lead.
Industrialization had to spread."
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. "The first mills depended on water power, subsequent industry on the
railroad and then the highway. As the technology of industry changes, so
do its locational requirements. It was to be expected therefore, that
firms would move in due course away from the older industrial centers in
the Commonwealth."
. "Massachusetts has the habit of taxing itself too highly, thereby
increasing business costs and creating an adverse business climate. The
state worsens this situation by costly regulation and by over-promoting
welfare service programs."
Such explanations are the orthodoxy in textbooks, in newspapers, and on television.
In recent years, this orthodoxy has included an additional explanation - the increase
in the cost of energy, which has placed the Massachusetts economy at a further
disadvantage.
At a surface level, these kinds of explanations seem to be quite reasonable. Hence,
the Advent Corporation moves to New Hampshire - the reason: to gain advantage
of lower social insurance taxes; or, an instrument engineering firm builds its new
plant near Route 128 - the reason: cheaper land and highway access. However,
there are major problems with such explanations. First, they say little about why
factors like the ones listed come into play and what forces underlie them. This is
to say, they treat technology, history, geographical advantage and politics simply
as exogenous factors: they do not really explain what has caused these factors
themselves to change or become relevant. Second, they implicitly assume
Massachusetts is part of a system where investment flows freely of itself from
more developed to less developed areas of the country and business operates in a
competitive situation, looking for least-cost locations to maximize investment
returns. But, this ignores the role state and federal governments have played in
facilitating and protecting private investment and, of course, the increasing
presence of powerful 'price-making' national and multi-national corporations.
Finally, these explanations tend to be historically shortsighted. For example:
while energy may well be an important consideration now, the traditional industrial
base of Massachusetts was declining for decades before the onset of the 1970s
energy crisis.
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There is a need, therefore, to go beyond these surface explanations - to go deeper
into exploring not what changes cause, but what causes change. To do so - and this
is most important - requires looking further than the boundaries of industrial
decline in the Commonwealth because, as we shall see, this decline is a part of a
much bigger pattern of economic change. There is, in short, a larger story of
capitalist development - a narrative not of balance and competitive equilibrium,
but of highly uneven temporal, spatial, sectoral, and corporate development the
outcomes and symptoms of which are now clearly evident in Massachusetts.
Uneven development over time
Over the last two centuries or so, the United states economy has grown
remarkably, but this growth has been neither harmonious nor smooth. Rather, it
has been characterized by severe ups and downs and spans of intermittent crisis and
depression. During the years between 1800 and 1973, there were no less than sixty-
one distinguishable periods of short-term business fluctuation:
. three periods of boom, totalling four years;
. eighteen periods of prosperity, totalling eighty years;
. seven periods of recovery and expansion, totalling twenty-one years;
. two periods of stagnation, totalling seven years;
. seven separate years of panic;
. twelve periods of recession, totalling seventeen years;
twelve periods of depression, totalling thirty-eight years.(1)
Over these same years, companies, markets and banking systems have become more
interlinked, progressively operating, first, on a national level and, subsequently, on
an international one. In addition, in the twentieth century, the federal government
has increasingly tried to deal with problems resulting from these business
fluctuations with national fiscal and monetary policies, often establishing national
institutions such as the Federal Reserve Bank. Consequently, Massachusetts has
become fully integrated with the rest of the American economy and increasingly
less immune to the general ups and downs of business cycles.
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In fact, since World War II, it appears that Massachusetts has become more
vulnerable to overall business cycles than most other states. Factories and
machines tend to be older in many of the Commonwealth's industries and,
particularly where owned by national or transnational companies, many times play
a secondary role to newer, more efficient machines elsewhere (ie: first to be laid
off as a downturn approaches and last to be restarted); the Commonwealth also has
many "durable" industries (producing goods like machine tools and instruments)
which tend to be more sensitive to economic downturns; and the defense-based
high technology industries in the state are highly vulnerable to political cutbacks in
orders.(2) The sensitivity of Massachusetts to these factors over and above the
"normal" ones was especially visible in the 1973-75 recession when, in the latter
year, official unemployment figures for the Commonwealth went as high as 11.2%,
compared with 8.5% for the country as a whole.
The propensity for capitalist economic development to veer rather rapidly betwen
boom and bust has, of course, been for a very long time the subject of much debate
and controversy amongst economists. Many economists try to explain these
fluctuations by blaming external shocks to a basically smooth system. For
example, in the nineteenth century, the British economist W. S. Jevons said that
economic cycles were caused by flucations in harvests in agriculture, which in turn
were caused by climatic changes related to sunspot activity.(3) More recently, this
tradition of blaming external events has its counterpart in accusations that the
Arabs and OPEC are responsible for America's current economic woes.
However, there are two problems with -such "act of God (or sunspot or sheik)"
explanations. First, it is hard to sustain that restrictions affecting one or two
commodities can curtail output in general. In theory, substitution should occur,
while in reality shortages have caused booms as often as they have caused
depressions (eg: during wars), Second, the sheer number and rapidity of these
fluctuations suggest that they must be due to processes intrinsic and internal to the
system.(4)
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For Massachusetts, these systematic fluctuations in the economy mean that much
care must be taken in analyzing what is happening within the state. Currently, for
instance, the Commonwealth is experiencing a "mini-boom": in the first months of
1979, unemployment dropped to "only" 6f%, production has increased, and
investment and plant expansions are up. In the light of this upturn, top state
officials have been unable to resist claiming that the credit is due to the state
government's improved relations with business, or as one report puts it: "The
reversal of Massachusetts' attitude towards providers of jobs has borne impressive
results."(5) The reality, however, is probably more that a national post-recession
upswing underlies the Commonwealth's improved business performance of late but
that the basic trend towards decline in the Commonwealth's traditional industries is
still there. Come the next downturn in the American (indeed, international)
business cycle, undoubtedly Massachusetts' performance will again reverse
(unemployment up, production and capital expenditure down), almost irrespective
of what attitude state government takes. Part of the reason for this lies in the
fact that most of the leading sectors of the Commonwealth's economy are owned
and controlled by national and transnational corporations who are basically not
amenable to the sort of measures state government typically adopts.
The fact that the American economy is highly cyclical in nature over time, with
Massachusetts being very sensitive to these cycles, means that in order to explain
what is happening in the Commonwealth's economy, a distinction must be made
between short-term, perhaps superficial cyclical events and long-term, more
fundamental structural change. However, there is an important relationship
between cyclical and structural change because, during periods of recession and
depression, an opportunity is provided for restructuring capital and introducing new
technologies and production methods which would be resisted by workers during
periods of full employment. While this relationship tells us little about why
particular industries undergo structural decline, it does help explain why that
decline occurred, or was accelerated, at particular points in time. Thus, in
Massachusetts, the deep unemployment of the 1930s weakened the ability of
workers to fight against wage cuts, labor reductions and, ultimately, the movement
out of much of the textile industry. However, as chapter 2 showed, the decline of
the textile industry in the Commonwealth was already well underway in the 1920s,
well before the Great Crash, although the depression did serve to speed up the
process.
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Uneven regional development
In addition to cyclical trends, economic development has also been very uneven in
geographical terms in the United States. There have been important changes in
economic structure as between regions - changes which have had, and which
continue to have, significant implications for Massachusetts.
In the 1870s and 1880s, there were extreme regional disparaties in America as the
fast urbanizing and industrializing New England and Middle Atlantic regions
became far more productive and wealthier than the agricultural Southeast and
Central regions.(6) But, as Figure 3.1 shows, since then income differentials have
narrowed among (although not necessarily within) the major regions. Within this
context of a regional convergence of per capita incomes, the position of
Massachusetts in relation to the nation has declined (illustrated in Figure 3.2).
Associated with this convergence on a regional level in average incomes, there has
been an important change in the distribution of labor amongst the three major
sectors of economic activity. In the late nineteenth century, the New England and
Middle Atlantic regions had a strong pre-eminence in manufacturing, while the
Southeast, Plains and Southwest were focused more on resource extraction (eg:
agriculture, forestry and mining). Now, in all regions, service employment is
dominant, while many other parts of the country besides the Northeast are
important in manufacturing. These regional changes in employment have been
particulary striking in recent decades. Between 1950 and 1975, nonagricultural
employment increased by 114.8 percent in the South and 136.3 percent in the West,
but grew by just 51.0 percent in the North Central region and only 30.6 percent in
the Northeast.(7) For manufacturing jobs, between 1970 and 1977, the Northeast
saw a drop of 681,000 (a decline of 11.5 percent), while the Midwest lost over
61,000 jobs ( a 1.1 percent decline). On the other hand, the South and West
combined gained more than 958,000 jobs in manufacturing (a 12.2 percent increase).
In the nonmanufacturing (service) sectors, the South and West experienced a growth
in employment over the same years (1970-77) which was nearly double the rate in
the Northeast and Midwest.(8)
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The Narrowinq of Differences in Regional Per Capita Income
REGION PER CAPITA INCOME AS PERCENTAGE OF U.S. TOTAL
U.S. = 100
1860
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Difference between
highest and lowest
(percentage points)
143
137
69
66
65
68
115
1900.
134
139
106
97
45
51
70
168
204
159
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce figures, quoted in:
W.W. Rostow, "Regional Change in the Fifth
Kondratieff Upswing," in Perry and Watkins (ed),
The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities, Sage Publications,
Beverly Hills, California, 1977.
Fiqure 3.2
Per capita
personal income
as % of U.S.
Relative Decline of Per Capita Incomes in Massachusetts
1929 1940 1950 1960 1965 1970 1975 1977
129.9 131.8 109.2 110.8 107.5 109.4 103.6 103.4
Massachusetts
total personal
income as % of U.S.
4.9 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.9
Source: New England Economic Almanac (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1977).
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1940
121
124
112
84
69
55
70
92
138
83
1975
108
108
104
98
90
79
91
92
111
32
I
Fiqure 3.1
Underlying their employment gains, particularly in manufacturing, the Southern and
Western regions have had significantly higher increases in investment in new
capital equipment. When the years 1970 and 1976 are compared, rates of capital
spending in the South and West showed a doubling in real terms, while in the
Northeast and Midwest the picture was much more static. The rate of capital
spending in Massachusetts was, in fact, 13.7% lower in real terms in 1976 than in
1970 (Figure 3.4).
As with all statistics, however, care needs to be take in interpreting these figures.
While the income statistics imply that the regions are converging as if by an
equilibrium process (and this is how many conventional economists see it), the
structural changes in employment and capital spending suggest something deeper
and more uneven. It seems that rather than converging smoothly towards a point,
there are fundamental differences between the old and new regions which have
arisen from a dichotomous and asymetric process of development. There is
evidence that high-skill industries and research and product development activities
have remained in the older industrial regions.(9) The Northeast has also retained a
leading position in financial and corporate office control functions and in
professional, education and health services.(10) On the other hand, it has been the
less-skilled types of industries and the manufacturing and assembly stages of
production which have most markedly been established in new locations, both in the
South and West and abroad. Thus, while Massachusetts has seen the now semi-
automated and routine work of textile production disappear to the South and,
increasingly, to the Third World, precision metal working and machine tool
development remains in centers such as Lynn.
A similar picture has emerged in the electronics industry. In 1958, during the early
stages of the development of electronics technology, Massachusetts was the
national leader in the production of electronic tubes. But, when tubes were
replaced by more simply made semi-conductors in the early 1960s, the production
of electronic components was dispersed out of state and employment in electronics
in Massachusetts fell.(11) Industries using semi-conductors and, subsequently, the
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The North-South Shift: Changes in Manufacturing and Services
Employment, 1970-77
MANUFACTURING
Number
of
Jobs
-681.1
- 61.3
Northeast
Midwest
% Change
1970-77
-11.5
- 1.1
NON-MANUFACTURING (SERVICES)
Number
of
Jobs
683.0
760.2
% Change
1970-77
19.3
30.5
Northeast & Midwest -742.4 - 6.4 1,443.2 24.0
South 607.1 12.7 1,167.2 42.2
Southwest 351.7 11.5 1,071.9 40.9
South & Southwest 958.8 12.2 2,239.1 41.5
United States 216.4 .1.1 3,682.3 32.3
Massachusetts - 40.3 - 6.2 79.2 17.7
Figure 3.4 Investment in New Capital Equipment
1970
(1970
dollars
Northeast & Midwest
South & Southwest
United States
Massachusetts
12,366.2
9,848.6
22,214.8
618.1
Source: (for both tables):
(Number in Millions)
1970
(1976
) dollars) do
1976
1976
llars)
18,129.3 18,943.2
14,438.4 21,592.1
32,567.7
906.2
40,535.3
781.6
1970-76
Change
(money
terms)
53.2%
119.2%
82.5%
26.5%
1970-76
Change
(real
terms)
4.5%
49.5%
24.5%
-13.7%
Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition,
The State of the Region (Washington, D.C., 1979).
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REGION
Figure 3.3
silicon chip have developed in Massachusetts, but their operations usually follow
this pattern of spatial division of functions For example, in mini-computing:
". . . the headquarters of two of the three top firms, accounting for over 50
percent of sales in the field, (are) located in the Boston area . . .
manufacturing capacity is spread out in the medium and small towns in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These factories make components and
sub-assemblies, but the development, testing, and other work which needs
close supervision is done in Boston. Labor-intensive, relatively unskilled
operations such as assembly of printed circuit boards and core components
are done in faraway places like Taiwan and Hong Kong."(12) (Emphasis added)
Underlying forces
The forces which have underpinned regional development in America but which, at
the same time, have caused that development to be uneven over time and space
(and, indeed, across nations) are complex and often contradictory. One basic
pressure has been the drive within capitalism to expand markets, to create
effective demand for growing production, and to realize profits. A good example is
the way Eastern finance and industrial capital not only pushed the western frontier
of ninteenth century American capitalism all the way to the Pacific, but also
advertised extensively in Europe to attract sufficient immigrants into those new
areas to consume the outputs of Northeastern industry, In addition, the physical
resources of those lands (eg: minerals and forests) enabled capitalists to make
large profits). As the population of these new areas increased, it was to be
expected that local retailing, construction, transportation, and manufacturing
would be set up. But this does not adequately account for why sections of capital
would abandon the older industrial areas and locate larger-scale, non-locally
serving production investment in the South and West.
Partly, the explanation for such development lies in a second basic force - the drive
to reduce the labor costs of production. This often takes the form of searching for
cheaper labor in the less developed areas so as to supply more profitably the
markets of more developed ones: in 1974, the average production wage in the
South was $3.60 per hour compared with $4.40 for workers outside the South. To
employ this labor, new plants are built in less developed areas (although another
way, which is more the pattern in less mobile service sectors, is to encourage
migration to the more developed centers). Thus, as Chapter 2, showed, at one time
Massachusetts was at the center of America's textile and shoe industries. Now it
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At a famous ball in Charleston, S. C.
"Did South Carollnb Improve your dividend picture?"
"Subetntially. All South Carolas belles in old-fashioned net
prfit. Wirkere are big producera. The government lowers
taxes. Tha counties offer site econounies. Power, water,
and constuction eoets are low. Extas dividends? Naturally."
Investigale South Carolina. Write or eall Walter Harper, Director;
State Devielopment Board. POplar 5-2912, Dept. NT-.Iso, Box 927,
Columbia 6.C. for free booklet, "South Carolins on the March."
Everything in Florida Favors the Businessman!
Ther is good reason for the big move by manufacturers, distrib-
utors ad retailers to the Metropolitan Miami area. They have found
that thel get away from the tensinns and worries that accompany com-
petitive cusiness in the crowded Northern cities. They find they can
live a nrmal happy life in friendly surroundings and still run their
businesses in a profitable efficient way.
Minurn-Dade County offer. a vast area of untapped potential in
many fialdr-agriculture, manufacturing, commerce
and industry. It is the foosl paint of four great
marlst aress-Dade County area, the Gold
(oeat market, Southern U. S. and CaribbeAn-
Latin American markets.
Check these advantages:
NIANPOWER'-Essy recruitment of 'tkilled help-spy, well-ed.
justed family people who work ell in this clean temperate imate.
GOVERNMENT-Friendly to business at state and local levels. No
state income tax, no ad valorem taxes. 55,000 homestead elsemption.
SITES-Many exoallent sites available near all tranptsuon, with
ample electric power. natural ge and abundant wete isepply,
MARKETS-Fastest growing area in. thie fast-growing :iuthesern
market, etrategieally located for selling to Caribbean or Lati-Ameri-
Can markets.
We invite businssmues to Muosstitete the freat Dsgeaiel rf Dade
County end Metreelite Miami waW/r lioin *nd Iser .Are a
pleasgre.
IN THE SOUTH, CONDITIONS WERE STRUCTURED TO SUIT THE NEEDS OF CAPITAL.
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fai lninrmatl6n regartling oppoitunitles for industry In Alabamb. write
Leland James. Directer, Planning amd industrifl Oevelopment 1ond, Stat
Capitol, Moytgomery, Alabama.
No New Capi al Needed for New Plant in Alabama
Munkipl Bonds for Construction Authorized
ML EXCUTLVE MR. EEUTIVE
-Here Are the Possibilities: 
-ere Is Hew it we'["YOU CAN NEGOTIATE a lang ternt lease on a dew
plant and equipment withost any cash outlay. If your bdsiness is on a soun Snancial basis and has
YOU CAN CONTINUE TO USE the plant &t a a record of successful operation, the municipal gov-
nominal yearly rent after the property costs hhve crnment or its incorporated agent - THE INDUS-
been paid off. TRIAL DEVELOPMENT 0BOARD - will work
YOU WILL NEVER PAY aty property tax- out the details of developir! your new plant.
YOU CAN BUtr the tax-free tiroject bonds and au- ,
ally make a profit while your rent is paying or '. Negotiate a mutual agreement on the type and
the financing a2d constructida costs of the pro ty. cost of the new plant and equipment you need.
2. The municipality or agent will linance the project by
issuing tax-exempt revenue bonds and you will pay just
enough rent during the maturity #eriod of the bonds to
cover amortization and interest.
3 Bonds may be issued with matur iy periods of 10 to 30
years. Once the bond issue is re red. you may rent the
plant for as little as S1.00 per year for the next 99 years.
4. You can buy the plant outright titer the bonds are te.
deemed, but it may be to your advantage to continue leasing.
As long as the property is held by the municipality or its
agent corporation, you will never have to pay real property
taxes.
has to import those products, either from the cheaper labor areas of the South or
from abroad. Indeed, the South is itself finding that it cannot compete with the
low-wage factories of the Third World (many of which are owned, or capitalized by
American companies).
Another part of the explanation lies in a third force - the need to maintain "the
authority of relations of production." It has been argued that:
"the shift of industrial development from the northeastern United States to
the 'sunbelt' (and to overseas) is in part a response to interegional variations
in labor militancy. Trade unions in the United States are not in general a
force for a radical change but their greater strength in the old established
industrial areas and the comparatively tough anti-union laws in the Southern
states provides a good reason for a locational reorientation of capital."(13)
Again, the previous chapter showed the effect of labor militancy, not only in
fighting to maintain wages and reduce hours, but also in resisting new, more
exploitive production technologies and methods. In the textile industry, it was
possible to out-maneuver Massachusetts workers by using a cheaper, less-organized
labor force elsewhere which was amenable to new production methods. And, when
major sections of electronics production left Massachusetts in the early 1960s, an
important reason was to find new workers who would accept higher productivity.(14)
Finally, a further explanation lies in a fourth underlying drive towards the
multinationalization of production, as the next section describes.
Uneven corporate development
As the American economy has developed, business firms have increased in scale and
complexity. Stephen Hymer comments:
"Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, there has been a tendency
for the representative firm to increase in size from the workshop to the
factory to the multidivisional corporation and now to the multinational
corporation. This growth has been qualitative as well as quantitative." bl)
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Suth
Carofifna
We don't have
labor pains.
Just look at the record. In the
past ten years, an average of only
three one-hundredths of one percent
of working time was lost due to labor
strife. Out worker productivity rate
is another source of pride-it ranges
14-25% higher than the national
average.
Our average working week is
41.2 hours. And our "right-to-work
law" insures the right to work regard-
less of membership or non-mernber-
ship in any organization.
So consider locating in South
Carohna. You'll be able to do busi-
ness painlessly here.
For more informaIion, send for
our new brochure called "South
Carolina: Resource For Industrv."
Write: J. Bonner Manly, Director,
State Development Board, Dept. 74A
P.O. Bo-92-, Columbia. South
Carolina 29202.
SmSouth Caroina has the lowest
work stoppage rate in the country.
ADVERTISEMENT FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA
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In the account in Chapter 2 of the development of the Massachusetts economy, we
saw very clearly the tendency for firms to increase in size. At the point of
transition from a commercial to an industrial base, the Commonwealth's firms were
almost entirely small, owned and worked by a master (aided, perhaps, by a few
journeymen and apprentices) or by a family. The application by the merchants of
their finance capital to industry transformed labor relationships, such that control
was now vested in an owner or small partnership while production was carried out
by workers who no longer owned the means for that production. As production
expanded and more sophisticated technology was introduced, factories were
established and it became necessary to have specialist departments - finance,
personnel, purchasing and sales, etc. During the intense competition and first
merger movement in the late nineteenth century, groups of factories were
combined together and national corporations developed. These were multi-
divisional, with many product lines being developed under separate divisions so as
to guarantee survival and growth. Finally, from the 1920s onwards, a group of
leading multinational corporations emerged, able to transcend national boundaries
and access foreign markets. These multinational firms developed centralized
planning, financial, research, and administration functions, but through their many
subsidiaries and branches, decentralized day-to-day management and production
decisions. The ability of large companies to divide up these functions has
facilitated the kind of spatial contrasts identified earlier.
For Massachusetts, as for practically all other states, an important implication of
the growth of national and multinational corporations has been the concentration of
control of the leading sectors of the Commonwealth's economy within a relatively
small number of firms. In 1977, there were 10,332 manufacturing firms in
Massachusetts, employing 609,000 workers. But fewer than 200 of those firms
controlled 40% of all jobs.(16)
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The trends towards concentration were intensified during the tremendous merger
wave of the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, the enormous scale of the leading
corporations owes more to acquisition and merger than to internal expansion. But
many of the firms purchased by corporations have been industrially unrelated. It
has been argued that:
"Often such (purchased) firms have been exploited for their tax shelter and
cash flow potential without any concern for the maintenance of fixed capital
resources and overall continued market competitiveness. Profits may be
siphoned off from one division to build up another, while the long-term
futures of both may be sacrificed in the interest of immediate profits. This is
consistent with the theory that conglomerates tend to lack a commitment to
any particular part of their holdings. ."(17)
According to the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, 862 mergers of
manufacturing firms occurred in the Commonwealth between 1967 and 1974. Four
hundred and seventy-nine (55%) of these transferred ownership out of state.(18)
But the increasing size and power of the leading corporations is a phenomenon not
only restricted to the manufacturing sector: a similar picture is evident in
retailing and finance, two other key areas in the Commonwealth's economy. Of the
twenty-five biggest employers in Massachusetts (in 1976, excluding government),
seven were companies in the retail sector.(19) Amongst these were corporations
like Federated Department Stores (a holding company, with 323 stores across
America, including Filene's and Bloomingdales, and sales of $4.92 billion in 1978, or
about as much as the Massachusetts state budget.)(2 0) Nationally, the trend in
retailing has been towards greater concentration with a dozen major chains taken
over or declared bankrupt in recent years. One retailing analyst, observing these
trends, has commented: "There is no reason why there should be more than ten
chains doing sales of more than $100 million instead of the fifty-four we have
today."(21)
Also amongst the biggest 25 employers in the state are the John Hancock Insurance
Company and the First National Bank of Boston. John Hancock was in control of
over $16.2 billion in assets in 1978, while the First National Bank back in 1973 had
assests of $8 billion.(22) In the banking sector, the trend has been towards greater
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consolidation: Massachusetts had 728 commerical banks in 1920, but this had
dropped to 142 by 1976.(23) The pace of consolidation in the Commonwealth has
increased in the 1970s particularly through mergers, acquisitions, and the
development of bank holding companies designed to skirt around state laws on
branching. This had lead to increased deposit concentration: in 1976, just ten
banks controlled 78.5% of all deposits in Massachusetts. In that same year, the
proportion of deposits concentrated in the top three banks in each of the state's
banking markets was: Boston, 57.0%; Worcester, 90.4%; Springfield, 81.6%; Cape
Cod, 63.0%; Pittsfield, 93.6%; Fitchburg-Leominster, 84.0; New Bedford, 91.9%;
and Fall River, 89.2%.(24)
The assumption of corporate control
In many ways, the tendency towards the concentration of capital under control of
large corporations lies at the root of the explanation of industrial change in
Massachusetts:
The large corporations and conglomerates have closed down many long-
established firms in the Commonwealth. To name just a few:
Converse Rubber, a division of the Electra Corporation closed its
Malden plant in 1977. Six hundred and fifty jobs were lost as a result
of the redistribution of operations to other manufacturing sites.
Berkshire Apparel Company, Malden's second largest employer and a
subsidiary of the Genesco Corporation of Nashville, Tennessee, shut
down and relocated to Roanoke, Virginia, in 1977.
General Electric, one of the world's major corporations has closed
four plants in Massachusetts since 1961.
The New England Provision Company in Boston, a subsidary of Ling
Temco Vaught, was closed in 1977, nine years after the conglomerate
had bought the plant.
Colonial Press of Clinton, owned by the Sheller Globe conglomerate,
closed in 1977 with a loss of 1750 jobs.( 2 5)
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Worcester plant
closing a division
WORCESTER - Crompton and
Knowles Corp., established in 1837, an-
nounced yesterday it plans to close its
textile machinery division here and trans-
fer it to North Carolina. The action could
be the first step toward shutting down the
company's entire Worcester operations.
Robert James, a company vice presi-
dent, said the textile machinery group is
being closed and moved Scuth "for eco-
nomic and consolidation reasons." The-
firm has two other plants in North Caroli-
na.
He said the move is due to begin soon
md to be completed by July 1980 when
the lease on the textile machinery plant-
expires.
Some of the plant's 100 employees will
be transferred, others will be transferred
to other divisions, or "placed in new jobs
elsewhere," James said.
Healso disclosed the company is hold-
ing discussions with unspecified princi-
pals about the sale of two other divisions'
here - a foundry, which employs 80
workers, and an automotive plant with 40,
employees, which manufactures auto--
motive parts.
Crompton and Knowles, primarily a'
specialty chemicals company, is head-;
quartered in New York.Its sales last year
totaled $200 million.
FROM A MAY 1979 ISSUE OF THE 'BOSTON GLOBE'
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. In total at least 788 manufacturing firms (over 50 employees), employing
at least 159,318 workers, closed between 1960 and 1978 in Massachusetts;
many of these were owned or shut down by parent corporations, although
the precise figure is not known.(26)
. For many of the closed plants, be they subsidiaries or branches of parent
corporations or independent firms, high costs, over-capacity and lack of
profitability in the face of competition from plants elsewhere were listed
as key reasons.(27) Often the competition has come from foreign plants
employing low-wage non-unionized, labor, especially in textiles, shoes,
apparel, and electronics. Many of these foreign plants are owned or
capitalized by American corporations, a situation which is encouraged by
federal tax provisions. The foreign profits of American-based
corporations are exempt from U. S. taxation until they are remitted back
to America and, even then, taxes already paid abroad receive a credit.
Overall, it is estimated that the overseas investments of U. S.
corporations between 1966-1973 led to a net loss of 1.06 million American
jobs.( 2 8 )
. Other plants have been closed because of the need to increase output,
cheapen the production of that output or keep up with the pace of
technological change. This is particularly true in the high technology
sector. But even where new investment to achieve these advantages is
placed in Massachusetts, there may well be less jobs because production is
more capital-intensive and they may be in a different location.(29)
A particular type of corporate plant closing is the shutdown or rundown of
profitable firms because of mismanagement, misallocation of overheads,
or the lack of a sufficiently high rate of return. Some plants in
Massachusetts which were making 10-12% on investment have been closed
because conglomerates demanded yet higher returns (sometimes up to
25%).(30)
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1960 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (31)
1961 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (57)
1962 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (76
1963 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (50)
1964 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (33)
1965 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (58)
1966 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (39)
1967 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (39)
1968 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (43)
1969 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (54)
1970 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (63)
1971 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (72)
1972 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (27)
1973 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (50) oooaL
0000000
1974 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (25)
0000000
1975 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (27)
1976 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (21)
1977 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (19)
~ L~EQIE 0013 urn 01978 XXXX (4) (Incomplete data) "ETR""
1960 - 1978: TOTAL = 788 KNOWN MANUFACTURING PLANTS EMPLOYING 50+ CLOSED...
...WITH LOSS OF AT LEAST 159,318 JOBS.
(Source: Carol Katz, Plant Closings in Massachusetts, unpublished data, 1979).
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. Corporations involved in finance, service and retail sectors have also been
involved in shut-downs and removals. Recently, the Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company, located in Boston and Burlington, announced plans to
move 500 jobs to New Hampshire. And, in January 1979, First National
Supermarkets abruptly closed five food stores in inner-city Boston with a
loss of 150 jobs (although one of the stores, in Codman Square, is now to
be reopened by a community development corporation).
Implications of uneven development
We have seen that a deep process of uneven spatial and temporal development is
evident within the economy; this uneveness is both capitalized upon and promoted
by large corporations. A few hundred of these large corporations now control most
of the leading sectors of the economy, not just in Massachusetts, but in America
and most of the First and Third Worlds. As these corporations have become more
advanced, they have increasingly developed the capacity to manage and restructure
labor relations in their favor by virtue of influence on government, through
corporate control of capital, plant, and financial institutions, and because of the
ability to operate, separate and relocate the stages of production on a world scale.
As the long list of closed plants testifies, we have seen that such corporate power
has certainly been exercised in Massachusetts.
The process of uneven development has other implications as well. Small business
which depended on the inputs to, or outputs from, a plant or firm closed by a
corporation, are placed in an invidious position and may well collapse themselves.
Service jobs in stores and restaurants adjacent to a closed plant are often lost too.
The local municipality and the state find that they face both higher unemployment
and decreased tax revenues. And, small businesses which are not dependent on, but
in competition with large corporations can have their markets undercut by low-
wage production from U. S. companies abroad. This is in addition to the problems
small firms face in raising capital, riding out business cycles, and matching the
research and marketing resources of large corporations.
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LARGE CORPORATIONS
HAVE THE ABILITY TO
OPERATE, SEPARATE,
AND RELOCATE
PRODUCTION ACROSS
REGIONS - AND NATIONS.
These trademarks represent 100 plant$ and research
centers operated In North Carolina byl 65 industries
on Fortune Mogazine's 195,9 roster of Arnerica's 500
largest corporatlons.
Uneven corporate development also implies the removal of control and/or
ownership of local industries from the local community. In the early days of
industrialization, factories were much more under the control of the community,
not only through local and state legislation, but also through the subtle controls of
community traditions and attitudes. However, the vertical and horizontal
extensions of the corporate hierarchy have widened considerably the social distance
between top executives and the workforce and local community. Furthermore,
unlike small businesses where the owners are local residents and thereby subject to
some community influence, a plant which is part of a large national corporation
may have its headquarters located in another city or, indeed, out of state.
Decisions affecting that plant will then be made in the context of the corporation's
overall national (and, perhaps, global) priorities and on criteria other than impacts
on the local workforce and economy.( 3 1)
Workers who lose their jobs, either because of uneven spatial development (firms
moving) or through uneven temporal development (lay-offs because of recession),
are particularly affected. Unemployment is humiliating, and often causes stress
and family tension. Studies have shown that displaced workers are more likely to
suffer from heart attacks, ulcers, hypertension, alcoholism and depression - at the
same time as they may be without the health insurance benefits their employment
formerly gave them.( 3 2) The problem of finding new work is compounded for
women, minorities and older workers. Uneven development has also affected the
structure of work in Massachusetts: as we have seen, traditional "blue-collar" jobs
have been lost, replaced either by high-skill jobs or low-skill, less stable secondary
labor market employment. The implication of this polarization has frequently been
to force yorkers to take jobs which pay less, which do not utilize their former
skills, and which are tedious and alienating.
The contradictory nature of development
This chapter has tried to show that the changes in Massachusetts economic
structure, including the decline of its traditional industries and the polarization of
its employment structure between professional/high-skill/high-paid and low-
paid/low-skill jobs, are related to wider processes of uneven development in the
economy. These processes manifest themselves in the form of uneven temporal,
sectoral, spatial and corporate development.
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In a sense, these processes of uneven development have brought enormous benefits:
the drive to maintain and increase profits, which underlies uneveness, has led to
rapid increases in production output and technological development over the last
two centuries, and has resulted in a large growth of material prosperity in America.
But, there have also been tremendous costs. Just as capitalist economic
development produces wealth, it also produces poverty; as it generates growth,
decline also results. These contradictory tendencies do not usually balance out, as
the preceding chapters have shown. Rather, they co-exist in an uneven manner and
in some tension. This tension is internal to the system, as the drive to maintain
profits and accumulate capital results in labor struggle at the point of production,
and also conflict at the community level. In the midst of all this, there are the
federal and state governments. Since we are concerned with Massachusetts, the
next chapter looks at the role played by state government, particularly in terms of
economic policy, in trying to deal with the problems and conflicts which spring
from the processes of economic change so far described.
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Merrimack Mill Buildings, Lowell, 1960
0JJ
Decaying Factory in Wal tham, 1979
AS CAPITALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GENERATES GROWTH, DECLINE ALSO RESULTS.
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CHAPTER 4
RESPONSE TO CHANGE: STATE ECONOMIC POLICY
As the economy in Massachusetts has developed and changed, so has the role of
state government in that economy. The Commonwealth's transformation from an
agrarian society, through commerce and industry, to a corporate-dominated
economy has been reflected in parallel developments in the size and nature of state
spending and state programs. Conversely, the intervention and development of the
state itself has been a key factor in the transformation of the Massachusetts
economy. We have seen that the forces behind, and the outcomes of, this
transformation have been sharply asymmetric: the process has been one of uneven
economic development and the state has been structurally involved in facilitating,
legitimizing and dealing with the consequences of it. Even though federal
government has assumed an increasingly significant role at all levels of the
economy, the state has been, and continues to be, important.(1)
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The growth of state intervention
In Chapter 2, many illustrations were given from the history of the intertwined
relationship between the state and capital accumulation in the development of the
Commonwealth's economy. We saw that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the state played a central role in stimulating and directly aiding
commerical capital and the transition to manufacturing. After the Civil War, while
still promoting the tremendous growth in capital accumulation, the state was
increasingly forced to step in to curb the excesses of that dramatic
industrialization and urbanization process. The actions of the state began to take
on an important social character, both to ensure the maintenance of a healthy,
labor force and to mediate, through social reform, the intense antagonisms between
labor and capital which, at times, seemed to threaten the very system itself.
With the advent of corporate capital in the twentieth century, the size and range of
functions of state government in the Commonwealth has been further expanded
(figure 4.1). The machinery of state now has over 76,000 employees and comprises,
in addition to the legislature and judiciary, an executive administration of ten
secretariats, a large and complex structure of departments and agencies, and
numerous affiliated quasi-state organizations, authorities and public corporation.
In fiscal 1979, the state budget is likely to exceed 5. 5 billion dollars - a sum which
governments of many countries throughout the world do not surpass.
There are several factors connecting the expansion of state government with the
development of corporate capital. In an advancing economy, more infrastructure is
needed (such as highways, sewers, mass transit and airports) and this tends to be
increasingly more costly and operationally complex. The need for skilled labor has
also grown, requiring expenditures on state universities and colleges. But, at the
level of state government, the largest increases in spending and personnel have
been in the welfare and human services sector, which now accounts for nearly half
the Commonwealth's budget (figure 4.2). Here, the state has been compelled to
socialize the costs of uneven development. As employment opportunities have left
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Growth of Government, Including State Government, in Massachusetts
1946 1956 1970 1977
GROSS STATE PRODUCT
Current Dol
Constant (1
1 ars
977) Dollars
(millions)
11,946 29,116
26,640 45,450
GOVERNMENT GROSS PRODUCT
Government Employee
Compensation,
(Federal and State and
Local in Massachusetts)
Current Dollars
Constant (1977) Dollars
Government Gross Product
as %,of State Product
STATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Current Dollars
Constant (1977) Dollars
State Spending as
% of Gross State Product
EMPLOYMENT
Massachusetts (all sectors) 1,701.1
Government 181.0
-Federal -
-State and Local -
Government as % Total 10.6
Employment
People per Government 25
Worker (approx.)
(thousands)
1,863.9 2,261.7
225.8 319.9
(61.7)* 65.0
(175.5)* 254.9
12.1 14.1
21 18
2,395.9
387.7
57.7
329.7
16.2
15
* 1958 figures
SOURCES: Gross State Product: New England (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1978);
Annual Report of Treasurer (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, various years);
Employment and Earnings, States and Areas (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1977).
INFLATION CONVERSION: $1(1977) = $1.561(1970) = $2.230(1956) =
U.S. Consumer Price Index.
$3.102 (1947) :
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47,803
47,803
932
2,078
7.8
575.4
1,283.1
4.8
4,773
4,773
10.0
174.7
541.9
2,807
4,381
9.6
2,254.5
3,518.4
7.7
5
5
,177.9
,177.9
10.8
from
Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2 State Expenditure in Massachusetts*
1977 Expenditures(a)
(millions of dollars)
% of Total
Human Services
Education
Debt Service
Sub-Total
Transport and Construction
Pensions
Administration and Finance
Legislature, Judiciary, Executive,
Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor,
Attorney General
Environment, Communities and
Development, Public Safety,
Manpower, Elder and Consumer Affairs
1,827.3(b)
1,023.4(c)
398.3
3,249.0
154.7
100.0
286.6
120.4
211.5
Total 4,122.3(0) 100.0
* Figures in this table are calculated on different basis than Figure 4.1.
(a)
(b)
Not shown in this budget are state expenditures for unemployment insurance
(administered by the Division of Employment Security) and state-controlled
federal expenditures (e.g., Manpower Affairs administers over $220 million
in federal CETA grants).
Of the Human Services budget, $611.5 million was for medicaid and $463 million
for AFDC.
(c) In the education account, $829.9 million went directly to local governments
as local aid.
(d) About twenty-six percent ($1,069.4 million) of this total went directly to
local governments as local aid. Included in this was $829.9 million for
education (mentioned above).
SOURCE: State Budget Trends 1970-1979 (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, 1978).
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44.3
24.8
9.7
78.8
3.8
2.4
7.0
2.9
5.1
the central cities of Massachusetts, the unemployed, underemployed and working
poor (those working but only earning low wages in the secondary industries that
have remained or moved in) have progressively concentrated in these areas and
become fully or partially dependent on the state. Indeed the continued profitability
of a number of secondary labor market employers is facilitated by a "work and
welfare" system which the state funds and organizes. In secondary jobs, the low-
paid, unstable routine, and undesirable nature of the work leads to high labor
turnover rates: for workers in this sector, the welfare system provides some relief
when they are between jobs and ensures, largely through low welfare payments and
lack of alternative options, that they are soon ready to take on another secondary
job.
Of the remaining parts of state expenditure, a large part goes straight to the
municipalities of the older cities to help ease the fiscal and human crises created
by the uneven development of corporate capital. However, very substantial sums
of money have also gone to develop the suburban areas of the Commonwealth - to
build the sewers, roads, hospitals and schools necessary to provide the framework
for the modern spatial restructuring of capital-labor relationships which Chapter 2
described.
State economic strategy
The argument that the state has consistently aided capital accumulation does, of
course, contrast sharply with the view more popularly presented. Usually it is said
that state government in the Commonwealth has severely hampered the private
sector and is largely responsible for Massachusetts' declining economic position.
This view - "blaming the state" - is frequently put forward in the media, by the
business community, and by many politicians. But this does not make it any the
more accurate. As Chapter 3 was at pains to point out, the reasons for the
Commonwealth's changing and declining industrial base are more correctly rooted
in the wider processes of national and international uneven economic development,
not the particular actions of state government. The growth of financial, clerical,
administrative, business service, scientific and advanced technological occupations
in Massachusetts is also basically a function of the wider development of the
corporate mode of accumulation and is not due to state or any other level of
government.(2)
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However, while the state has not directly caused the changes and developments
seen within the Commonwealth's economy, it has played an integral part in helping
them occur. In terms of economic strategy, this help has come in two ways. First,
the state has promoted new areas of economic activity to replace the traditional
mill-based industries. Second, the state has tried to stimulate capital investment
and accumulation by improving the Commonwealth's "competitiveness" and business
climate.( 3 ) Both of these strategies have encouraged, although not caused, uneven
economic development: the first has helped in the shift of capital from old areas
to new locations and uses; the second has helped by generally minimizing
constraints as to what capital should do and pay for, thereby allowing capitalist
development to run its uneven course.
The strategy of promoting new areas of economic activity, as we earlier
discovered, goes all the way back to seventeenth century Joseph Jenkes and the
eighteenth century state-chartered public corporations, It is a strategy the state
has particularly promoted in the post-World War II period with the decline of the
Commonwealth's traditional economic base and has involved:
Building, not only of Route 128, but also of other major highways, to
facilitate the development of new, high-technology industries and
research centers.
Encouragement - particularly in the larger central city areas - of
urban renewal. This has tended to replace declining areas of old
industry, retailing and housing (usually low-income) with new office
buildings, more profitable middle-income and luxury housing, car
parks, and - at times - hotels, medical and university buildings, and
convention centers. The means used to assist these shifts to service
activities have often involved tax abatements (Chapter 121A),
bonding and infrastructure provision.
Exemption from state sales and use taxes of all machinery and
replacement parts used by manufacturers in corporations primarily
engaged in research and development.
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STATE ECONOMIC STRATEGY
. Provides incentives and
capital subsidies (left)
. Builds infrastructure (below)
. Promotes new areas of
economic activity (bottom)
NEW
I. -nP ort of Bosto7
s Q:". 7 Central Artery Unsnarls Traffic. A new aystem of
- ! - arterial highways through Boston has brought uburban markets
-. - A- 2 virtually to the doorsteps of the air and sea rts. The Central
Artery over downtown Boston connects with e Southeast ant
Northeast expressways, and eliminates the ty of traffic bottle-
--- - f-eck that strangles some other large cities.
NDLSTRL O rGAE NSURA~c Unequaled Concentration. Under a ew lav, the Mar
sachusetts Port Authority operates a complex f transportation
-faellities. The Authority is reducing costs, he roving iiency
- - -and.encouraging utilization. The facilities are in ted in a man-
-9lp nor which permits easy transshipment of goo among the ehan.
-- nels of sea, air, ftil or highway.. The Mystic Rn r Brtdge for ex-
CRBAN 1OB NCENTIVE ample, provides a smooth link between the long wide runways of
-L gan International Airport and the deebwater oston port facil.
- - ities.
- - Within a mere 14 miles - situated on lfassachusetts' re-
- nowned Route 128 "Electronics Highway'-is Hanscom Field at
P1 'Redford.
New TaClities. In its Initial phases of development, the
Massachusetts Port Authority plans a two year odernization pro-
h- gram for its w terfront properties, and a seri of construction
* -. projects at n International Airport to m ntain its leading
position as a j t-age gateway. This will result n major pier im.
e e s --- provements along the entire porte the erection of Sugars, terminals facilities and the reliabilitation of runways, ta iways and apron
A .-..- I
C
-83-
.g
0.
0
I-
Z
do.
77 -_ 1
. Reorientation of part of the state's employment and training system
to meet the labor requirements of high technology industry.
. A new Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation, set up
(replacing the older Mass. Science and Technology Foundation) to
provide technical assistance and start-up capital to small, innovative
technology-based businesses in the state.
. Establishment of a Government Land Bank to purchase surplus
military property, leading to new industrial parks at Westover and
South Boston and advanced development proposals for Charlestown
Naval Yard and Chelsea Naval Hospital.
. Recently, the state has played key roles in packaging two major
development schemes in the City of Boston: Copley Square (providing
office, hotel and retail space) and Park Plaza.
The second strategy, making the Commonwealth more competitive, has led to the
state to take a range of actions believed to reduce business costs and improve the
state's competitive position relative to other states. These have recently included:
Developing a package of tax incentives which include ". .. the largest
investment tax credit offered by any state in the nation, sales tax
exemptions for production equipment, tax credits tied to additional
employment, tax exempt financing for plant expansions, tax credits
to reduce high urban real estate taxes, and protection against local
taxation of machinery and equipment."(4)
Provision of cheaper capital for businesses, developers and banks
through state financing agencies like the Massachusetts Industrial
Finance Agency, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, and the
Massachusetts Home Mortgage Finance Agency. Because the state
allows these institutions to issue tax exempt bonds, they can charge
below market rates for capital to their borrowers.
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. Reducing the cost of the unemployment insurance system to
employers by excluding unemployment compensation from workers
who "voluntarily" quit their jobs.
. Subsidizing the costs of hiring and training workers through programs
like the "Job Match" system, META (Massachusetts Employer
Training Assistance) and STIP (Skills Training Improvement Program).
Besides directly reducing business costs, making the state more competitive also
includes improving the "business climate." This is, however, an ephemeral factor:
according to a study of the history of social legislation in Massachusetts by Low
Income Planning Aid, the cry of "poor business climate" has been raised repeatedly
by the state's business community since the beginning of the present century to
defeat progressive legislation which could cut into their power or profits.(5) But,
more often than not, state officials have believed and acted upon these business
climate claims. For instance, when Howard Smith was Secretary for Economic
Affairs in the Dukakis administration, his publicly stateadecision rule was "Where a
judgment is a close call, the underlying bias should be for business." Smith believed
it was vital for government to give the business community "signs" that the state
was holding the line on the social overheads of doing business.(16)
The power of capital over state economic policy
Despite the popular presentation of the state as anti-business, it is really not much
of a revelation to say that a key objective of state government is to help the
owners of capital make profits. State officials make this quite public. In 1960, for
example, Governor Foster Furcolo took out an advertisement in the New York
Times, where he stated: "I give my personal assurance that under my
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administration a healthy climate for business will be maintained and strengthened
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."(7) More recently, the administration of
Governor Dukakis ran an advertising campaign which exclaimed: "We're starting to
run this state like a business. Because we want to make this state a better place
for business."(8) Governor King's statements are very similar. Using the slogan
"Massachusetts Means Business," his advertisements offer employers a
"Massachusetts Check Book" of tax incentives and state financing aid.(9) However,
the state's role in facilitating capital accumulation depends on more than just the
particular personalities and beliefs of the people who occupy state office: rather,
powerful structural mechanisms exist which necessarily place the state in this role.
Although the state bears a heavy burden of "unprofitable" social services which are
important in allowing capital accumulation to operate, the state depends upon
private accumulation and the institutions of private capital in order to finance its
activities. The state relies on tax revenues, which are generated by the private
sector; it also relies on debt financing mechanisms and the private capital market.
To protect its tax base and maintain its access to capital markets, the state, like it
or not, cannot ignore the interests of business and finance.(10)
Because of the state's dependence on the private sector, the owners and controllers
of capital are provided with considerable leverage. Developers and corporations,
particularly large ones, can adjust and readjust production and location decisions,
play off states against one another, and obtain highly favorable tax packages and
publicly financed infrastructure, business and manpower training services. As
Gerald Blakely, Jr., head of Cabot, Cabot and Forbes, has said: "Capital is mobile
and goes where places are receptive and constructive."(11) Unsurprisingly, business
organizes, through groups like the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation and
Associated Industries of Massachusetts, to ensure that state remains receptive and
constructive. Beside the influence these organizations have on the state, their
(well-financed) argument that capital and jobs will leave the state if taxes or
business costs are raised influences voters - as illustrated by successes in defeating
proposals for a graduated income tax and flate rate utility charges in the 1976
referendum.(12)
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DIRECTORSHIPS AMONGST SIXTEEN OF THE
COMMONWEALTH'S LARGEST EMPLOYERS.
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The banks have also used their position as controllers of the state's access to
capital markets to make certain the state heeds the corporate viewpoint. The
leading bank has been the First National Bank of Boston, which according to Tee
Taggart, the Director of Research for the State Banking Commissioner, has
historically assumed the role of spokesman for the business community in matters
of state tax policy. Taggart describes how, in 1975, the Bank refused to underwrite
a crucial state bond issue unless the state cut an extra $650 million from its social
services and medicaid budget and raised the sales tax (which is a regressive tax)
from 3% to 5%. The state complied, for if it had not, the effect of being unable to
sell bonds would have been fiscal collapse.(1 3)
However, it is important to stress that state government has not been simply an
instrument of the owners and controllers of capital. Indeed, if this was the case,
capital would hardly need to organize campaigns or threaten to withdraw from the
state. Rather, as the Commonwealth's history indicates clearly, the state has been
an arena of much debate, struggle and conflict. People have resisted, sometimes
forcibly, actions which the state has tried to take. At the same time, groups of
people have continuously attempted to use the state machinery as their means of
opposing sections of business, or advancing social reform. On a surface level, much
of this political activity has had an ethnic character, but beneath that the deeper
issues have been distributional (e. g., who gets the available jobs, or gets to live in
particular neighborhoods). In recent years, there have also been mounting pressures
from those who have borne the heaviest costs of uneven development - minorities,
welfare recipients (through advocacy groups) and inner-city residents/communities
- to make the state increase its programs of social expenditure. Often, however,
such activity has set one group against another, with the state the focus of
attention - not capital and the uneven process of economic development. But there
have been many occasions when the interests of particular companies or groups of
businesses have been threatened, as with campaigns by labor unions to legislatively
raise minimum wage laws - which usually affect marginal and competitive firms,
rather than larger companies. In 1978, there was a campaign over the property tax
classification admendment, which the opponents (largely big business) did not win.
In sum, by no means has capital always dominated the arena of state government;
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important reforms and laws have been won, although usually after long and hard
periods of political action, which have gone against the short-term interests of
particular groups of business in the Commonwealth. But, the resilient power of
capital and its structural hold on the state has continued and it has often been able,
over the course of time, to turn once threatening social reforms to its own ends -
(for example: the way unemployment insurance now bolsters secondary labor
market employers).
How effective?
Although this chapter has focused upon describing some of the more recently
introduced state inducements to encourage business to remain, start up, or expand
in Massachusetts, this kind of state intervention is certainly not new. The history
of the development of the Massachusetts economy, which Chapter 1 outlined,
showed that the state has been involved in the economy from the beginning. We
saw quite clearly that in the early years of the Commonwealth, the state was
instrumental in promoting business and manufacturing, through such means as
monopoly rights, public corporations, land rights, infrastructure development,
capital subsidies, and tax allowances. But the nature of capitalist economic
development has changed markedly since then. As explained in Chapter 2, not only
has capitalism advanced beyond and away from the old centers of development (in
England and New England); there have also been significant qualitative changes,
particularly the development of large corporations which are able to operate and
direct capital on a national and international basis. Given this context, the
question is: How effective are the Commonwealth's contemporary economic
strategies?
The answer which Governor Dukakis gave to that when he was in office was very
clear. Writing in 1978, Dukakis emphasized that "through state government we
have been working hard to make Massachusetts an even more attractive place for
business." After describing the measures the state had taken, he concluded that
they had "resulted in a more vigorous, accelerated growth of Massachusetts
industries."(14) Bob Conway, currently Assistant Commissioner at the
Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development, also thinks the
-89-
Commonwealth's economic development programs have been successful. His view
is that without these programs, business expansion would be much slower in
Massachusetts and more firms would have chosen to relocate in other states.(15)
And, perhaps most vocally of recent occupiers of the executive office, the present
Governor believes strongly that the state economic policies of the kind described in
this chapter can be effective in promoting the business sector. With the intent of
making economic development the "cornerstone" of his administration, Governor
King has put forward a five-pronged economic program: lowering taxes,
simplifying government regulations, managing energy resources, training
manpower, and attracting industry.(1 6 ) The Governor's underlying objectives are
quite plainly to reduce business costs and improve the business climate; in other
words, King is emphasizing the second of the two major strategies state
government has typically adopted in the Commonwealth - that of making the state
more competitive.
However, although state officals may claim that their strategies have been, or will
be, successful, the evidence points to a rather different interpretation. Many
studies have shown that state programs which seek to lower business costs have, at
best, only a marginal effect on improving production and employment. Economists
Ben Harrison and Sandra Kanter point out that the leading sectors of the economy
are dominated by large firms who have some market power in setting prices and
output levels. For these firms, reductions in the kinds of costs which state
government can effect are likely to have little impact, other than to increase
profits. They argue that large companies do not really need tax incentives and
capital subsidies because such firms are able to use internal financing or borrow
money from banks. On the other hand, smaller businesses, operating in the
competitive sector, face uncertain markets and are in a much less stable position
to take advantage of state incentive mechanisms; when they do, they often provide
secondary, rather than primary employment.
Harrison and Kanter go on to argue that for all firms, the state attempts to cut
business costs cannot significantly stimulate demand and that, in any case, one of
the costs that the state most often tries to cut or give credit for is state and local
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business taxes, yet these are very small part of the business costs - varying from a
half to 3 percent of value added. The effect of reducing state and local corporate
taxes is further minimized by the fact the 48 percent of any savings are subject to
federal corporate income tax. Moreover, seeking to reduce some business costs in
Massachusetts is unlikely to attract out of state firms to physically move into the
Commonwealth, first, because the number of these "footloose" firms is actually
small (in the U. S. between 1969 and 1972, states on average gained only .3 percent
of their 1969 employment base by firms physically moving in and lost only .2
percent from firms physically moving out); second, moving or building a plant is a
major corporate decision and is rarely made on the basis of marginal adjustments in
tax or debt financing costs; finally, since almost all states now have similiar
incentive packages, the savings differentials between states are not very
meaningful.(17)
Furthermore, besides the failure of state business incentive strategies to produce
new outputs or jobs, they also have real costs because tax revenue is foregone
which could have been put to alternative uses. Harrison and Kanter estimate that
the revenue cost to the state of ten business tax incentives in Massachusetts in
fiscal 1974 exceeded $100 million.(18)
The conclusions reached by Harrison and Kanter on the ineffectiveness of state
business incentive programs in cutting business costs and in increasing employment
and production have been backed up by other researchers and by studies of business
investment and location decisions.(1 9 ) Indeed, George Kariotis, the chairman of
the electronics firm Alpha Industries and currently Secretary for Economic Affairs,
has himself said that, tax incentives are only secondary considerations in business.
Speaking of employment tax credits, he says that employers hire first according to
their needs, and then look afterwards (sometimes at the end of the financial year)
to see if they can pick up tax credits.( 2 0)
The other key strategy which the state has used to intervene in the economy -that
of promoting new areas for investment and capital accumulation - has been more
effective than incentive programs, but these effects have been adverse as well as
positive. Projects which have depended upon state intervention have included the
state highway system, particularly Route 128, the extension of the Red Line to
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Quincy, the Boston Waterfront development, Government Center in Boston, many
urban revitalization efforts, and the general development of hospitals, schools, and
wastewater treatment facilities. Considering the tens and hundreds of millions of
dollars often involved in these projects, it is hard to sustain that they have not had
an impact; rather, they have added construction jobs, some public sector jobs, and,
most significantly, opened the way for private and profitable investments.
However, much of this investment (often using federal funds too) has had the effect
of facilitating suburbanization and the movement out of industrial and other types
of employment from the older urban areas. This has encouraged the process of
uneven development described in earlier chapters, with its heavy cost in terms of
displaced workers and housing and neighborhood decline. State funds have also
gone into downtown central business districts, to develop office centers and
increase retail trade volumes. Besides the physical destruction of urban
neighborhoods (including destruction through building expressways) which these
developments have frequently caused, the growth of low wage clerical,
administrative and service jobs has been boosted, while the better jobs have tended
to go to suburban residents. And, just as state promotion of the suburbs has
depleted the tax base of the central city, it has also been true that downtown
revitalization has helped less towards improving city tax bases than might be
thought. To encourage commercial development, local governments (with state
permission) have commonly granted tax exemptions and made agreements with
developers under Chapter 121A of the General Law of the Commonwealth. In
Boston, tax exempt property increased from 28% of total valuation in 1950 to 55%
in 1977. One estimate placed the total valuation of tax-exempt property at over
$930,000,000 in 1968. Through Chapter 121A agreements alone (which allow
developers to make small payments in lieu of property taxes), the City lost over
$21 million in tax revenues in 1971.(21) Even discounting the fact that downtown
revitalization projects may increase the demand for government services, these
tax-exempt developments clearly shift the tax burden from business to workers.
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At the bottom line - the number of good jobs added and retained - the
Commonwealth's economic intervention strategy has fared poorly. As we have
mentioned before, over the last ten years, the number of jobs which pay more than
the official lower living income level has decreased sharply. Measured by several
other key indicators, not only has Massachusetts been outperformed by the South
and West, it has usually done less well than the average for Northeastern and
Midwestern states. For example, between 1970 and 1977, per capita income grew
by 69.7 % in Massachusetts, but by 75.7% in the Northeast and Midwest and 86.4%
in the South and West. Overall non-agricultural employment grew 4.5% in
Massachusetts over these years, but by 7.4% in the Northeast and Midwest and
25.8% in the South and West. Manufacturing employment fell by 6.2% in
Massachuetts, dropped 6.4% in the Northeast and Midwest and grew 12.2% in the
South and West, while service employment grew 17.7% in Massachusetts, 24.0% in
the Northeast and Midwest, and 41.5% in the South and West. Finally, between
1970 and 1976, annual investment in new capital equipment changed by - 13.7% in
real terms in Massachusetts, +4.5% in the Northeast and Midwest and +49.5% in the
South and West.( 2 2)
Thus, the evidence suggests that the state is captured strongly within a wider
framework of uneven development and that the Commonwealth's strategy of
offering all kinds of inducements to tempt industrialists, developers and
corporations has been quite unable to turn this situation around. Indeed, it seems
as if the state's strategy has intensified uneven development and the growth of
secondary jobs. Moreover, the recent recovery of sections of the Commonwealth's
economy (noticeably durable manufacturing) almost certainly owes more to the
national post-recession revivial than state policy, and, in fact, is now slackening in
Massachusetts as the national economy slows down. And, the poor performance of
the state's economic strategy cannot be put down to a lack of application:
Massachusetts compares 'favorably' with other states in the business incentives and
inducements it offers. In a survey of nineteen major tax incentive categories
published by the U. S. Department of Commerce, Massachusetts offers incentives
in twelve. Of New England states, only Connecticut equalled this, while New
Hampshire offered incentives in five fewer categories. Amongst industrial states,
only New York offered incentives in more categories - yet, this state has one of the
slowest rates of all. The Southern and Western "sunbelt" states offered fewer
incentives than Massachusetts, despite their higher growth.(23)
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Underlying purposes
If, in fact, the first of the state's major economic intervention strategies has been
unsuccessful, while the second has had some severely negative effects, it can fairly
be asked: Why has the state followed these strategies? Could it be that state
officials, pressed by the need to do something to attract capital and development in
an economy which is performing badly, are forced to resort to admittedly weak
policy instruments because the state has so little influence over the local economy?
Or, are state officals just pro-business, giving public handouts to corporations and
developers?
There may be some truth in both of these interpretations, but, as Harrison and
Kanter point out, there are more substantial reasons. The state's economic
strategies have to been seen in the context of, what they call, "the continuing
struggle between capitalists and workers over access to and control of capital."(24)
We have seen, in Chapter 2, that this struggle has been a basic and pervasive factor
in the development and change of the Massachusetts economy and that, as well as
occurring at the point of production, state government and policy has also been a
central arena of labor-capital conflict. In a sense, this conflict is an inherent
tendency within the governmental system because, while the state (along with
federal and local government) absorbs the social and private costs of capital
accumulation, the profits accrue to, and are controlled by, the private sector. The
process of uneven development has intensified the evident conflict within this
arrangement, since it has led to an increased need for state and local services yet
decreased the available tax base to support them. Uneven development has caused
workers to be displaced, generated unemployment, and substituted traditional blue-
collar jobs with low-wage, less stable employment. Industries have been shut down
or removed in many older communities, housing and neighborhoods have declined,
and the restructuring of the suburbs and central cities for new forms of
employment has been a costly public expense. Moreover, working people have
increasingly come to see public services as an important part of their own real
income and have organized to extend this "social wage." But, in an era of inflation,
declining purchasing power, and insufficient ~well-paid jobs, people have also
resisted carrying the increasing tax cost of these services. This resistance has
largely occurred at the local level because of the heavy reliance on property taxes,
but the state has been affected because of the real political and fiscal need to
redistribute state revenue as local aid.
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On the other hand, although they benefit directly and indirectly, the owners and
controllers of capital have, historically and currently, fought the imposition of
business taxation to finance the public sector. There have been two underlying
reasons for this. First, by reversing the distribution of real income away from
workers and to business, they increase profits. Harrison and Kanter argue that tax
and capital subsidies which do not effectively compel companies to behave
differently than they would have done otherwise are politically viable ways of
redistributing profits back to capital.
Second, and perhaps of more significance than these monetary benefits, the state's
economic strategies have had an important political and ideological value for the
business community. In a situation where there is continual (and, at times, violent)
conflict between labor and capital, there is always the threat to business that
workers and community organizations will use the machinery of the state to extend
beyond regulation of things like hours and conditions - to use the state to more
directly control capital and further improve their real income through progressive
social legislation. The political history of Massachusetts shows that workers and
community organizations will seek to do this, although with more or less vigor
depending upon conditions at the time. Capital responds, using its structural power
over the state (which we examined earlier), by resisting generally the extension of
the state sector. It most resists "unprofitable" social improvements (like increasing
welfare) and efforts to decrease its hold over labor (in the past, child labor laws;
nowadays, extensions of the minimum wage and unionization). And, it attempts to
focus more state expenditure on activities more supportive of profitable private
accumulation (such as infrastructure improvements and technical education). In
this struggle, the area of state economic policy is effectively a place where capital
can seek advantage to help it resist the wider incursion of sectors of the state
which are "unprofitable" or which restrict capital's freedom. Using the "business
climate" argument, the business community presses for tax incentives and capital
subsidies because the political and ideological benefits as much as for their
monetary value. As George Kariotis, Secretary of Economic Affairs, says of tax
cuts: "The actual number of dollars is not that important. . . We just need to show
some reduction. It's the image we're after."(25)
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Summing everything up, it seems that the Commonwealth's economic policy has
largely acceded to the interests of capital and has, indeed, facilitated the
weakening of the economy through uneven development. The state has also failed
to significantly improve the economic and social conditions of many of its
residents. Certainly, the changes in the wider economy, and even the actions of
federal government, have been ultimately more important than state intervention,
but the state has gone along with and facilitated these forces. The issue now, of
course, is whether there are any alternatives which the state could follow so as to
really improve employment and investment. That is the subject of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
There is a corollary to "blaming the state" for the poor performance of the
Massachusetts economy in recent decades, namely: to blame other states, regions
or countries. Thus, not only are we told that Massachusetts is an economic
casualty because of a "war between the states," but also that the Commonwealth
has lost out because of an inter-regional "sunbelt versus frostbelt" fight and the
global contest of America against Japan, Western Europe, and the industrial Third
World.(1) Often, organized labor has been as quick, if not quicker, than politicians
and the business community in indicting places like New Hampshire, North
Carolina, or Taiwan as guilty partners in causing Massachusetts' economic and
employment problems. And, while their language may be less direct and more
academic, many conventional economists have often backed up these accusations,
for they have long suggested that economic development can largely be explained
by place-related factors such as access to transportation facilities, physical
proximity to complementary economic activities and services (which economists
call "agglomeration economies"), or naturally available cheap labor.( 2)
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However, although blaming the state and blaming other places (and, by implication,
other workers) are common explanations for economic problems, the evidence
argues that both of these are too superficial and simplistic. Certainly the
Massachusetts economy has changed fundamentally over the years, faring less well
than many other areas. But the basic driving forces beneath these changes lie
neither within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, nor within any other particular
state, region or nation. Rather, the changes in locations and patterns of
employment experienced in Massachusetts have to be viewed in the context of
wider developments in the process of capital accumulation. While these
developments have proceeded unevenly and impacted different areas in different
ways, in themselves they have been a-spatial and ubiquitous, not intrinsic to any
one place.
Amongst these wider developments, we have seen that fundamental changes in the
very nature of capitalism have been foremost in accounting for the specific
changes experienced in Massachusetts. Chapter 2 illustrated how, first, the
introduction and, subsequently, the growth and concentration of capitalist
economic development transformed the colonial economy of Massachusetts,
through mercantile capitalism, into an economy based on industrial accumulation.
Driving this process was a continual need to search for profits, leading to continued
attempts to raise the productivity of labor. In the twentieth century, developments
at the wider level again transformed the structure of capital accumulation in
Massachusetts, as large national and multinational corporations and financial
institutions came to dominate the leading sectors of the economy.
This argument - that the employment and economic changes seen over the years in
Massachusetts have basically been caused by wider developments within capitalism,
and not through actions of state government - has been one of the major points
which the previous chapters have tried to document.
A second major point has been to show that this process of change has followed a
clear pattern which has had a definite logic and purpose. At first, increased
investment in plant and machinery led to the development of a working class who
were employed in, and lived in the communities which arose around, new centers of
production. But, as investment in capital continued to increase, as the size
of the leading corporations grew, as new production methods were introduced and
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traditional skills declared obsolete, and as conflict between labor and capital
intensified, production and other functions related to it began to be reallocated
over space. Disinvestment occurred in the Commonwealth's older industrial areas,
and new centers of less expensive and less experienced labor (in terms of labor
struggle, old work customs and methods, and community conflict) were developed,
both in other locations in Massachusetts (e. g., suburban areas) and in other regions.
The communities around the old production centers declined, while new residential
areas and retail activities were established in relation to the new production
centers. This process of adjustment and re-adjustment of production and other
economic functions over space to suit the needs of capital accumulation has gone
through several stages in Massachusetts. Amongst the most recent has been the
reconstruction of downtown areas in the Commonwealth to serve as loci for the
various administrative, financial, and business services which are now essential to
capital accumulation in this era of corporate pre-eminence. Importantly, the
pattern in Massachusetts is not unique - the experience has been similar in other
older industrial areas in America and Western Europe.
The third major point has been to demonstrate that these changes and transitions
have been neither smooth nor harmonious, but basically reflect a process of
economic development which is sharply uneven. Over time, as Chapter 3
highlighted, the economy has fluctuated between boom and bust and crises of
accumulation have developed. During these crises, capital has tried to restore (or
find new) conditions which will allow a further period of capital accumulation. We
saw that the Massachusetts economy was very sensitive to these economic ups and
downs and that during crisis periods the way was opened for capital to restructure
its relations with labor. The chapter also linked changes in Massachusetts with
regional and national changes, and argued that the apparent decline of
Massachusetts and the Northeast and the development of the South and West were
not independent events, but could only be understood as interrelated outcomes of
the uneven process of capitalist accumulation on a national and international scale.
Finally, the fourth major point has been to show that the state has played an
integral part in facilitating capital accumulation in the Commonwealth. This is a
key point for two reasons: first, because the state has been, and continues to be,
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popularly presented as "anti-business;" second, because reference is often made -
usually as part of business attacks on the state - to an earlier age of "laissez-faire"
and minimal state intervention. We now know that both of these arguments are
quite erroneous. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, state intervention to aid capital
accumulation has been an economic fact of life for three centuries in
Massachusetts. Chapter 4 re-emphasized this, showing how, particularly in the
post-World War II period, the state has increasingly acted to deal with the poor
performance (i. e., insufficient profitability) of the Massachusetts economy. We
saw that the state has tried to increase the "competitiveness" of Massachusetts, by
seeking to attract new industrial and commercial employers, and by restructuring
downtown and peripheral areas so as to open them up for new waves of capital
accumulation. But, because the state's role has been essentially to facilitate and
not to direct capital accumulation, we also saw that the policy instruments which
the state (and its municipalities) have been forced to use have tended to
redistribute real income to capital without adding good jobs and to encourage
uneven development, rather than reverse it. And, of equal (if not more)
importance, we saw that the state has increasingly accepted the social costs of
uneven economic development, thereby facilitating the continued operation of
private capital accumulation.
What future for Massachusetts?
If this is the history, then what of the future for Massachusetts? As mentioned in
earlier chapters, some politicians have recently made warmly optimistic
predictions of the "turn-around" of the Massachusetts economy. But the
employment gains which the Commonwealth has experienced in the last two years
mainly reflect the national post-recession recovery and the evidence now indicates
that this growth is "winding down."( 3 ) Moreover, the optimism these officials
express needs to be viewed with circumspection: in the late 1960s, when
unemployment in Massachusetts was officially placed at about four percent, today's
measured unemployment rate of over six percent would have been cause for
concern rather than pleasure. If Massachusetts did not have the 30,000 temporary
jobs now funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, today's
measured unemployment would exceed seven percent, and while this figure would
include disproportionate numbers of youth and minority workers, it would exclude
discouraged workers, the under-employed, and the working poor.
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On the other hand, there are those who are quite plainly pessimistic. Jeremy
Rifkin and Randy Barber, for instance, argue that "the northeast/midwest corridor
of America is fast becoming a strip of giant industrial ghost towns." In their view,
the banks and corporations have redlined the entire region from Chicago to Boston
and capital is moving en bloc to the Southeast and Southwest, leaving the cities of
the Northeast and Midwest in economic and financial ruin.(4) If we accept the
Rifkin-Barber prognosis, and given a continuation of current public policy, the
future for areas like Massachusetts is one of grim and deep economic regression.
But, at least as far as Massachusetts is concerned, Rifkin and Barber may not as
much be over-pessimistic as too simplistic. The prospect for the state needs a far
more careful analysis, for several reasons:
While certain kinds of manufacturing capital have left, and are
continuing to leave Massachusetts, other types of capital have not.
As Chapters 2 and 3 explained, capital has tended to leave
Massachusetts to search for less-skilled, less-costly, non-unionized
labor (textiles, apparel and electronics assembly, etc.). But, as John
Heckman observes: "Some production processes cannot be
automated, so that the firm is tied to the technological complex
where it orginated. This is especially true of high value metalworking
and precision electronics such as are found in the medical instruments
field. Gas turbine aircraft engines are another example."1(5)Massachu-
setts has developed these advanced industries and the highly-skilled
labor pool which they require. While the fortunes of these industries
may fluctuate with the business cycle and with defense orders and
may, to an extent, be affected by technological change (e. g.
introduction of micro-processor machine tools), it does not seem
likely that they will exit from the Commonwealth in the same way
that textiles or leather goods have.
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Rifkin and Barber overestimate the "autonomy" of the Sunbelt region.
The Northeast has retained its corporate control functions, and
leading positions in finance, research and development, and advanced
education and health care.(6) Again, Massachusetts (and the Boston
SMSA in particular) has these activities, and is likely to retain them.
On the other hand, the current era of slow overall growth in the
American economy indicates that educational and health-care
institutions and research firms are unlikely to experience in the 1980s
the kind of expansion they saw in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Moreover, although clerical and administrative occupations may
continue to grow absolutely, the introduction of new office
technologies (word processors and mini-computers) is likely to cause a
restructuring of many jobs.
As capital has left older industrial areas in the Commonwealth, the
way has been opened for new types of capital accumulation. When
disinvestment has occurred, the workers who have been displaced and,
more important numerically, the workers entering the labor market
who otherwise would have taken traditional manufacturing jobs, then
became available for new employment. In the words of Harry
Braverman, ". . .as capital moves into new fields in search of
profitable investment, the laws of capital accumulation in the older
fields operate to bring into existence the 'labor force' required by
capital in its new incarnations."(7) The evidence presented in earlier
chapters suggests that this new capital has tended to provide
employment in clerical, service, and sales fields, and that this work
has usually been low paid. In the future, this process is likely to
continue in Massachusetts and may well be most prominent as the
movement to revitalize and recapitalize the central cities gets
underway. This revitalization will provide new employment, but
much of this will tend to be in relatively low pay jobs in hotels,
restaurants, retail stores, offices, services and security/janitorial
functions.
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Even though many traditional blue-collar occupations have declined in
the state and while part of what is left will almost certainly go the
same way, a significant number of traditional industrial jobs can be
expected to stay (over and above those which will be retained to
serve the advanced industries already mentioned). These will include
jobs which are locally-serving (e. g. in printing or food-processing)
and jobs in small firms and even some larger ones which are retained
basically because of inertia. But, as the figures for manufacturing
wages indicate (Chapter 1), many of these jobs will be in firms which
pay less than the national average.
Thus, rather than the picture of absolute decline painted by Rifkin and Barber, the
future for Massachusetts (at least, in the 1980s) will probably be one of continued
uneven development: some sectors of the economy will do well, others will
continue to decline. Overall, it seems likely that the Massachusetts economy will
continue to perform more poorly than the United States average (i. e. to provide
fewer opportunities for capital accumulation than regions to the South and West),
for it is quite unrealistic to expect otherwise. As Harrison and Kanter observe:
"As public cost of reproduction rises over time, taxes and other costs
of doing business will rise in the South and West. But there is no
reason to think that firms will then turn around and repopulate New
England. Capitalist economic development is simply not that easily
reversible. A more likely forecast would be for increased exporting
of capital and jobs out of the country altogether."?(8)
Because of this, and because of the other factors the last few pages have listed, the
likelihood is that the labor market in Massachusetts will continue to polarize and
that structural employment problems will probably worsen. There will be
insufficient well-paid jobs and too many jobs which are dull, dehumanizing and low-
paid; high levels of youth and minority unemployment will persist; and wide urban-
suburban dichotomies will continue. These look to be the underlying trends in the
next decade for the Commonwealth, and while they may be more or less visible as
the business cycle fluctuates, they will affect real people and impose upon many
very real human costs.
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What are the alternatives?
Unfortunately, given these trends, it seem doubtful that the state's current
employment and economic policies, as promoted by Governor King, will have any
substantial impact. Indeed, to the extent that they succeed, the Governor's policies
will in all probability intensify the trends towards uneven development in
Massachusetts. As mentioned before, the Governor is advancing a five-pronged
approach: lowering taxes, simplifying government regulation, managing energy
resources, training manpower and attracting industry. The underlying strategy is to
use public resources and powers to cut business costs and improve the 'business
climate' in the Commonwealth.
The first issue here, of course, is whether the Governor can actually do all these
things. One of the major planks of his program - the cutting of property taxes by
$500 million through caps on local spending and increased state aid - is already
severely shattered. Opposition in the legislature has minimized the effect of the
tax cap, while the very fiscal crisis of the state, as explained in Chapter 4,
together with opposition from outside groups, has reduced the amount of state
money King can reimburse, despite his severe attacks on welfare. Overall, less
than $200 million dollars will probably be reduced from property taxes. In other
areas, too, there can be reasonable doubts as to what the Governor will be able to
implement. Many politicians have tried in the past to simplify government
regulation and got nowhere, although King will probably be able to override due
process in certain situations and ignore established rules; the manpower training
system in the state has been shown time and time again to be rarely effective at
doing anything other than containing or redistributing unemployment; the
ineffectiveness of policies to attract industry has already been discussed and we
have seen that the amount of "footloose" industry is very small, that industrial
location decisions are rarely made on the basis of the kinds of incentives the state
can offer, and that many other states besides Massachusetts are trying to do the
same thing; finally, King's program of managing energy resources heavily depends
on the promotion of nuclear power, but that is now - to say the least - a route
fraught with difficulty in the light of the recent events at the Three Mile Island
nuclear power station in Pennsylvania.
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However, presuming that the Governor can implement at least part of his strategy,
what will the effect be then? First, while King's program to lower property taxes
and marginally decrease the state personal income tax may well have the corollary
of increasing real estate values, these higher post-tax incomes are unlikely to lead
to much in the way of increased capital investment in Massachusetts or the
creation of additional good jobs. Investment decisions are made by capitalists, not
workers, and on the basis of expected profitability. While, in theory, cutting income
and property taxes could marginally reduce business costs, we have already seen
that at best this will encourage secondary employers and low-paid jobs, rather than
primary well-paid employment. The King administration does, of course, point out
that in return for cutting taxes, the high technology industry will "create" 60,000
new jobs in the Commonweath (the Governor's "social contract"). But while there
is evidence that these extra jobs were forecast well before King was in office,
there is no guarantee that these jobs will actually appear, particularly in view of
the coming recession.(9)
Second, two of the Governor's other policies may well have negative job
implications if implemented. There is now plenty of research which argues that
nuclear power, where it does not actually destroy jobs, has much less of an
employment impact than equivalent investments in less capital-intensive
alternative energy sources.(10) And, the Governor's plan to simplify government
regulation is really a euphemism for reducing environmental protection. This has
led the Governor to oppose the Bottle Bill, even though studies show this would
increase net employment.
Finally, in a general sense, because the Governor is committed to minimizing the
constraints on capital, this leaves the way open (by how much depends on the
actions of labor) for the process of uneven economic development to continue, with
all the adverse consequences that entails. Even if the Governor was able (bearing
in mind the historically determined context within which he has to operate) to take
measures to gain more control over capital, his administration has shown itself
quite unwilling to take even the first steps in doing so - as their opposition to
selective targeting of industrial revenue bonds and to the Plant Closings Bill
illustrates.
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But all this is not surprising: the history of state economic policy in Massachusetts
tells us that while Governor King may well be amongst the most explicitly pro-
business of executive officials, most of his predecessors have followed similar
strategies - albeit willingly or not. More significantly, this history also tells us that
in a capitalist society, the basic role of state government, in conjunction with other
levels and branches of government, is to secure conditions favorable to capital
accumulation and capitalist economic development. We have seen that the state is
placed in this position more by dint of structural and class forces than by the
actions of particular officials. So, can the state implement a new and alternative
economic strategy able to reverse some of the forces of uneven capitalist economic
development? And, how can the ways in which capital is placed and replaced be
altered so as to be more favorable to the Commonwealth's depressed communities
and to its workers, especially those who are unemployed, under-employed, trapped
in the low-wage, unstable secondary labor market, or forced to work in dull, unsafe
or dehumanizing jobs?
The principles of such an alternative economic strategy are not hard to determine,
for they follow directly from the analysis of uneven economic development. These
principles include: the need to increase the commitment of capital to workers and
communities; the need to assert the public right to direct the flows of capital; the
need to increase economic democracy and worker and community control over
capital; the need to coordinate action in Massachusetts with that in other states;
and, the need for action at the federal level to control capital and equalize working
conditions upwards, not downwards, through such means as encouraging
unionization in the South. Moreover, there have been many detailed proposals, and
some experimentation, as to the policy measures and instruments needed to fulfill
these principles of an alternative state economic strategy. For example, Edward
Kelly suggests; plant closing legislation and compensation; more strongly enforced
takeover legislation; increased use of public financing institutions, state
development banks, and pension funds to protect and develop local ventures; and,
the development of worker and community ownership. At the federal level, Kelly
argues for more regulation of corporate relocations; ending of tax laws and tariff
codes which favor overseas investment; elimination of anti-union "right-to-work"
legislation; and increased aid to small locally-owned businesses. Many others have
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TRYING TO USE THE STATE - WORKERS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
TESTIFY FOR LEGISLATION TO COUNTERACT PLANT CLOSINGS,
APRIL 1979. THE LEGISLATION WAS NOT APPROVED - THIS TIME.
-109-
developed proposals along the lines Kelly has followed.(11) A few of these
proposals have now become realities in Massachusetts, with the establishment of
the Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation, (which provides
finance for community-controlled ventures) through work of the Cambridge-based
Industrial Cooperative Association (which has been key in setting up workers
cooperatives), and with the growth of Community Development Corporations.
However, the problem still remains of how a fundamentally different alternative
State economic policy can be implemented, a problem which is at once economic
and political. Certainly it is not difficult to develop on paper the elements of an
alternative strategy, and it is not impossible to get one or two parts established.
But the problem here, as the Massachusetts Community Development Finance
Corporation illustrates all too well, is that one or two parts by themselves are
insufficient to be effective, that they become little more than state social
expenses rather than instruments of significant change, and that changes in
personnel and administration over time will dilute their purpose. Yet to attempt
anything more substantial very quickly invokes the power of capital - a fact that
one state by itself cannot overcome. This is not to say that no attempts at all
should be made to use the state as an instrument to counteract uneven economic
development, for the adverse effects on people's lives, their communities, and their
physical and social surroundings would be too great. In any case, this is an
impossibility, for people will continue to struggle against capital and they will try
to use the machinery of state: it is intrinsic to the system. Nor is all this to imply
that small changes are of no value. Rather, it is to re-emphasize what our
historical analysis has already made obvious - that the causes of the structural
economic problems now evident in Massachusetts lie not within the state nor within
other areas, but are rooted in demands of private profitability and private capital
accumulation which operate on a national and transnational scale. Once this
relationship is appreciated, it is clear that the effectiveness of alternative
economic policies at the state and local level is limited -these policies can only go
so far in tackling the process of uneven economic development. At the same time,
it is surely evident that unless a widespread understanding of this very relationship
is built, there will not be the political base needed to implement even these limited
state policies, let alone to support the more fundamental alternative policies
necessary at a wider level.
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